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COMMENTS
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BANK MERGERS: THE
REVOLVING DOOR OF PHILADELPHIA BANK

I.

SQUARE PEG IN A RouND HoLE: THE LAW AND THE FACTS

WILLIAM H. ORRICK, JR.: Certainly there is no disputing the fact that the
Philadelphia National Bank easel was the most important antitrust decision of the
year and, perhaps of the decade.2

On November 15, 1960, the second and third largest Philadelphia
banks, the Philadelphia National Bank-its assets 1.09 billion dollars, its
deposits 603 million dollars-and the Girard Trust Com Exchange
Bank-its assets 757 million dollars, its deposits 560 million dollars-applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for approval to merge.8 The
application stated the intention of the Philadelphia National (PNB) to
acquire the Girard, including all its assets, deposits, capital, and retained
earnings, thereupon to disgorge stock in a resulting bank to Girard shareholders at a ratio of 1.2875 to J.-i Both Girard and PNB had a history of
merger and acquisition. Since 1950, PNB had acquired nine formely independent banks and Girard six, and these acquisitions had aggrandized
the banks' asset growth to the extent of 59 and 85 percent, respectively,
their deposit growth 63 and 91 percent, their loan growth 12 and 37 percent.IS The new bank to operate under PNB's national charter would
control 36 percent of the area bank total assets, 36 percent of deposits and
34 percent of net loans. 6 The Comptroller of the Currency, passing upon
the merger pursuant to his authority under the Bank Merger Act of
1960,7 took into account, inter alia, the effect of the proposed merger upon
competition, including any tendency toward monopoly. Disregarding
unfavorable advisory opinions from the Department of Justice, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board, he approved the union on February 24, 1961, as in the public interest.8 On the
374 U.S. 321 (1963) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
Speech before Antitrust Section, American Bar Association, by William H. Orrick,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, August 12,
1963. Reported in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 50.197, at 55220.
s Figures are derived from the Government's exhibits 2 and 8 admitted in evidence at
trial, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The
deposits are those of individuals, partnerships, and corporations, as distinguished from
those of states and municipalities.
4 See principal case at 332.
5 Id. at 331.
6 Ibid.
7 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963).
s No opinion was rendered at that time. In his annual report to Congress, however,
the Comptroller justified his approval on the ground that there still would be ample
banking alternatives in Philadelphia and that the beneficial effect upon national and
international competition would outweigh any locally anti-competitive effects. See Government's Exhibit 164, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
1
2
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day following, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, alleging
violation not only of section 7 but also of Sherman Act section 1,9 filed
suit to enjoin the merger.
The language of Clayton section 7 would seem to exclude bank mergers
from its ambit:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly- or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly." 10
The Supreme Court settled long ago that the PNB-Girard type of merger
is for section 7 purposes an assets acquisition.11 Further, a bank is not a
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission.12
Nevertheless, three years after the filing of the complaint, the Supreme
Court in a five-to-two 18 decision reversed the trial judge sitting in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and held that the anti-merger section of
the Clayton Act is applicable to banks and that the Philadelphia merger
violated that statute since, in reasonable probability, it would produce
a substantial lessening of bank competition in the local four-county
Philadelphia market.
At first blush the decision would appear astounding. Prior to 1961,
the statutory language had been interpreted to be so definite in its thrust
that Justice had never challenged a bank merger. Indeed, the Department
stood by in 1955 as the 831 million dollar Pennsylvania Company for
Banking and Trusts merged with the 228 million dollar First National
Bank of Philadelphia to form the city's largest bank. In the nation's
financial center, New York City,, Justice took no action either in 1954, as
the 3.4 million dollar Chemical Corn Exchange Bank absorbed the 859
II 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The Government throughout
the case vigorously argued the applicability of the Sherman Act and relegated the Clayton
Act to a secondary position. The Court found it unnecessary to decide the Sherman Act
question once it found the Clayton Act violation.
10 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
11 See Arrow-Hart 8: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); Swift 8: Co. v.
FTC, decided together with FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). The PNBGirard merger was technically a consolidation wherein the merging entities, their assets,
liabilities, rights, and franchises would disappear into ~e resulting bank.
12 The FTC under§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 72 Stat. 1750, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(6) (1958), has no jurisdiction over banks.
18 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark, and Douglas joined Mr. Justice
Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented.
Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote a memorandum in which he argued that the Clayton Act
was inapplicable but that the merger violated the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice White took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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million dollar New York Trust Company, or in 1959, when the 3 billion
dollar Guaranty Trust Company fused with the 969 million dollar J. P.
Morgan and Company. Again silent was Justice in 1957 when the Chase
National and the Bank of the Manhattan Company joined to become the
mighty Chase Manhattan. In effect, Justice by 1959 had thrown up its
hands. As then Attorney General Brownell testified before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, "On the basis of these provisions
[Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act], the Department of Justice has
concluded, and all apparently agree, that asset acquisitions by banks are
not covered by Section 7 as amended in 1950." 14 Attorney General
Brownell, along with virtually everyone else, proved misled by the fact
that the anti-merger statute speaks not in terms of merger, but of stock
and asset acquisition.
The Supreme Court in Philadelphia Bank avoided entirely the dilemma
created by a literal construction of section 7. The Government, Mr. Justice
Brennan reasoned for the majority, argued that the transaction was a stock
acquisition. The banks argued it was an assets acquisition. Actually, both
were right. The arrangement fitted neither category neatly. The transaction was a merger and could be analyzed only by reference to the congressional design. Construing the intendment of putatively inapplicable section
7, the Court reasoned as follows:
"Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would give § 7 a
reach which would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations,
from pure stock acquisitions to pure assets acquisitions, within the scope
of § 7. Thus, the stock acquisition and assets acquisition provisions,
read together, reach mergers, which fit neither category perfectly but
lie somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum.'' 15
The Court then held:
"So construed, the specific exception for acqurrmg corporations not
subject to the FTC's jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7
only assets acquisitions by such corporations when not accomplished
by merger.'' 16
Mr. Justice Brennan's interpretation of the statutory language, while
highly sophisticated, was suggested neither by the arguments of the Antitrust Division, nor by the legislative history, nor by the precedents. The
Government in its brief and argument had so subordinated the applicability of section 7 to that of Sherman Act section 1 that Mr. Justice Harlan
in dissent was impelled to begin: "I suspect that no one will be more
14 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957 before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1030 (1957).
15 Principal case at 342.
16 Ibid.
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surprised than the Government to find that the Clayton Act has carried
the day for its case in this Court."17
Mr. Justice Harlan's comment was directed not only at the majority's
interpretation of the statutory language. The defendants had argued that
even if Clayton Act section 7 ever controlled bank mergers, its applicability
had been repealed by implication in 1960 when Congress enacted the
Bank Merger Act, which delegates to the federal banking agencies responsibility for the approval of almost all bank acquisitions. 18 The act prohibits
all forms of bank merger without the consent of the Comptroller of the
Currency if the acquiring or resulting bank is to be a national bank, of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System if the acquiring or
resulting bank is to be a state member bank, or of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation if the acquiring or resulting bank is to be a nonmember insured bank. The Comptroller, the Board, or the FDIC, as the
case may be, is to base consent upon six factors: the financial history and
condition of the merging banks, the adequacy of their capital structure,
future earnings prospects, the character of management, the convenience
and needs of the community to be served, and the effect of the transaction
on competition (including any tendency toward monopoly). The statute
charges the appropriate agency not to approve the application unless, after
a consideration of all these factors, together with advisory opinions from
the other two banking agencies and the Department of Justice, it determines that the merger is in the public interest. It was upon application of
this six-strand public interest standard that the Comptroller approved the
Philadelphia-Girard union.19
The banks' argument rested upon two assumptions: first, that the
legislative history of the Bank Merger Act clearly discloses a congressional
apprehension that the Clayton Act is inapplicable to banks; 20 second, that
Congress, with the supposed inapplicability of section 7 in mind, delegated
regulatory responsibility to the Comptroller and the other banking agencies.
Therefore, the banks concluded, the Bank Merger Act is the exclusive
mechanism created by Congress to solve the problem of adverse competitive
consequences ensuing from bank mergers. The merit of this argument must
be gleaned from an examination of the interrelationship between antitrust
and direct government regulation as tools of national economic policy.
Principal case at 373.
64 Stat. 892 (1950), as amended, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963).
The Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board had strongly disapproved
of the Philadelphia merger in advisory opinions. The FDIC, while conceding an adverse
effect upon local competition, pointed out the pro-competitive effects upon the national
and international markets.
20 Compare H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960) ("The federal antitrust
laws are ••• inadequate to the task of regulating bank mergers; while the Attorney General
may move against bank mergers to a limited extent under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act
offers little help.'), with S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959) ("Since bank mergers
are customarily, if not invariably, carried out by asset acquisitions, they are exempt from
section 7 of the Clayton Act.').
17
18
10
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The .American economy is readily perceived as divided into two sectorsfree market and government regulated. In the predominant sector-the free
market-individual entrepreneurial action spurred by the demands of the
competitive process is depended upon to maximize economic growth and
output. The antitrust laws are thought to be the guardian of this free
market sector to assure that entry remains unrestricted, that decisions are
independent and not collusive, and that action is competitive and not
predatory. In this area, concentration of market power in a few entrepreneurs or even monopoly itself has not been considered a per se antitrust
offense. Only monopolization-the abuse of market power by practices
clearly tending to stifle competition-has been proscribed.21 Because many
American markets are oligopolistic rather than monopolistic in structure,
the anti-merger statute is the most formidable weapon in the Government's
arsenal against undue concentration of market power. And even section 7,
it must be noted, is a weapon against future, not present market domination.
The smaller segment of the economy, in sharp distinction, is subject
to direct governmental control. In the so-called regulated industries, Congress has entrusted administrative agencies with basic economic judgments:
the conditions of entry into the market, the type of service to be rendered,
the expansion or contraction of the area of enterprise, safety and insurance
regulations, the issuance of securities, the price structure (rate making), and
the market structure (merger, consolidation, and acquisition). Underscoring
the distinction is the fact that a number of the so-called regulated industries
-with power, radio, ·and television as notable exceptions-are expressly
exempt from the antitrust laws.22 Indeed, congressional understanding that
antitrust regulation applies principally to unregulated markets was indicated by Representative Celler's remarks on the House floor in introducing
the I 950 amendments to section 7:
"Four companies now have 64 percent of the steel business, four
have 82 percent of the copper business, two have 90 percent of the
aluminum business, three have 85 percent of the automobile business,
two have 80 percent of the electric lamp business, four have 75 percent
of the electric refrigerator business, two have 80 percent of the glass
business, four have 90 percent of the cigarette business and so forth.
"The antitrust laws are a complete bust unless we pass this bill." 23
21 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., ll0 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), afj'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
22 For example, mergers approved by the CAB relieve any person affected by the
administrative order from the operation of the antitrust laws "insofar as may be
necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by
such order." 52 Stat. 1004 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958). Similar exemptions
are provided in the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 908 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(ll) (1958),
and the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1070, as amended, 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47
u.s.c. § 222 (1958).
23 95 CONG. REc. ll485 (1949) (remarks of Representative Geller).
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It seems evident that Representative Celler considered the major target of
the 1950 amendment to be further concentration by merger in the freemarket sector. It is interesting that conspicuously absent from his remarks
was the highly concentrated banking industry.
The Court, however, has come to regard the regulated-non-regulated
distinction as more obvious than important. The true issue, as the Court
has posed it, is not whether there is regulation, but whether regulation
indicates subordination of government planning to competition as the
economic policy controlling the particular market. The issue stated in this
fashion had emerged from three decisions of the Court prior to Philadelphia
Bank. While none of the three precedented the breadth of section 7 jurisdiction enunciated by Mr. Justice Brennan, all seemed to provide a basis for
rejecting the banks' contention of implied repeal.
In United States v. Radio Corp. of America,24 RCA and its wholly owned
subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), agreed to exchange
their Cleveland VHF television station for one in Philadelphia. Philadelphia
represented the country's fourth largest market area; Cleveland, the tenth.
The nature of the exchange-relinquishment then acquisition-was necessitated by FCC regulations limiting NBC to five VHF stations in toto.215
The arrangement received FCC approval, albeit over strong dissent, as in
the "public interest, convenience and necessity," and the transaction was
consummated. Subsequently, when the Department of Justice challenged
the exchange, the Supreme Court held that FCC assent did not conclude
the Government upon any antitrust issues involved in the administrative
proceeding. FCC approval could not affect a pro tanto exemption from the
antitrust laws.
Although the relevant agency in RCA did not specifically consider the
antitrust factor, this was decidedly not the case in California v. FPC. 26
There the El Paso Natural Gas Company first acquired the stock of the
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation and then sought permission of the
FPC to swallow the assets pursuant to section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.27
Prior to the FPC application, the Antitrust Division had brought suit
attacking the acquisition as violative of Clayton Act section 7. Justice repeatedly asked the Commission to stay proceedings pending the outcome
of the lawsuit. The FPC refused so to do, and upon continuance of the
court proceeding, the Commission, having considered the effect upon competition, went ahead to authorize the merger, which was speedily consummated. The State of California intervened in the administrative proceedings
and demanded in vain a stay pendente lite. An appeal ensued and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari. The Court found that the natural
gas industry, although publicly regulated, is not exempt from the operation
2i

358 U.S. 334 (1959).

2ts See 47 C.F.R. § 3.636 (1958).
26
27

369 U.S. 482 (1962).
61 Stat. 459 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1958).
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of the antitrust laws. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas the Court held
that where a merger is challenged in the courts under the antitrust laws,
the Commission must stay subsequently initiated administrative proceedings
until a final judicial determination is reached. Once again the presence of
regulatory authority failed to preclude the operation of the antitrust laws.
The pattern of decisions indicating that administrative superintendence
ordinarily will not pre-empt antitrust enforcement in a regulated industry
has not been undeviated. The Supreme Court found the antitrust laws
inapplicable in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,28 where
the Government alleged: first, that Pan American and W. R. Grace and
Company, each fifty percent owners of Panagra, unlawfully agreed in forming the joint venture that Panagra would enjoy freedom from Pan American
competition along the west coast of South America, while Pan American
would remain unencumbered by Panagra competition in other areas of
Central and South America; second, that Pan American and Grace conspired generally to monopolize air commerce between the United States
and Latin America in violation of sections l, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act.
The Court analyzed the defendants' acts as route-fixing agreements and
distinguished such conduct in this context from price-fixing and the monopolization by acquisition alleged in RCA and California.29 It was further
observed that the CAB, under section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
could investigate and order stopped unfair practices or unfair methods
of competition, including allocation of routes or other illegal combinations
among carriers.80 Thus, where regulation is perceived to be this extensive,
the antitrust laws are inapplicable.
The impact the Pan American decision might have had upon Philadelphia Bank would at first appear far-reaching. Pan American clearly seemed
to resolve the implied repeal issue against the Antitrust Division. But such
niceties could not and did not present a multitude of problems to a court
that had just found section 7 of the Clayton Act applicable to bank
mergers. The facts in Pan American were indeed distinguishable.81 The
CAB had continuing authority over Panagra's activities. It could issue a
restraining order at any time. Air routes are but a creature of administrative
discretion. They are subject to change or cancellation at the stroke of a
pen.82 A merger, however, bears the distinction of finality. When the
Comptroller approves, absent antitrust inquiry, the joinder is irrevocable.
The Court, in likening the principal case to California rather than Pan
American, took a giant step along the line of decision imposing antitrust
policy upon the regulated industries. Mr. Justice Brennan read California
28 371 U.S. 296 (1963).

Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306 (1963).
72 StaL 731, 769, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958).
Curiously enough, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
dissented in Pan American.
32 See Federal Aviation Act § 401, 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 137l(e)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
29
80
31
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to mean that administrative approval of a merger, even where the agency,
in passing on the merger, has taken into account the competitive factor,
confers no immunity from Clayton Act section 7. In the context of bank
mergers, he reasoned, the Bank Merger Act does not require the Comp~
troller to accord the competitive factor any particular weight. He merely
considers it in passing, along with the other normative standards defined
in the statute. It is clear, the Court concluded, that such a scheme of
regulation could not have effected an implied repeal of section 7.83 Both
jurisdictional hurdles had now been cleared.
II.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.

THE MERGER URGE: BANKS AND BANKERS

UNTERMYER: You are opposed to competition, are you not?
MORGAN: No, I do not mind competition.
UNTERMYER: You would rather have combination, would you not?
MORGAN: I would rather have combination ...•
UNTERMYER: Combination as against competition?
MORGAN: I do not object to competition, either. I like a little competition.34.

The structure of commercial banking in the United States is unique.
While commercial banking is conducted by a small number of centralized
institutions in France or England, in the United States the industry consists of thousands of separately incorporated, units. Whereas in Belgium or
Sweden there are but a few banks with many branches, here branch banking is rarely permitted state-wide and, in any event, it almost never exceeds
the borders of a single state. In Germany or the Netherlands, banks are
chartered exclusively by the central government; here there is a dual banking system permitting the chartering of commercial banks by both federal
and state authorities.
In spite of this structural decentralization, however, commercial banks
individually, and the system as a whole, represent vast repositories of
economic power. Dealing in credit, the banking system has the power to
generate demand deposit accounts amounting to approximately seventy-five
percent of the public money supply.35 In addition to being the most important lenders to individuals, partnerships, corporations, states and municipalities, banks play other roles. They receive and administer time and
savings deposits, engage in foreign exchange activities, execute trust
functions, provide a source of currency to individuals and businessmen,
render safe deposit services, and perform a variety of counseling, agency, and
service functions.80
Bank competition is vigorous and exists at all levels. There is competition for deposits, competition for loans, competition for trusteeships, and
88 Principal case at 351-52.

34. Testimony of J. P. Morgan in response to questions of Special Counsel Samuel
Untermcyer, before the Pujo Money Trust Investigation, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1050 (1912).
SIi Principal case at 374.
so See Court Reporter's Typed Transcript at 2286, United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'! Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
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competition for counseling and foreign exchange business. The banker
competes principally in the rendering of services, since bank prices, i.e.,
interest rates, indirectly respond to federal regulation. Minimum bank
interest rates are virtually set by the Federal Reserve Board and, while the
maximum is limited only by state usury laws, rate levels tend to reflect monetary policies of the Board.37 With respect to loans, of course, interest rates
represent only base price.38 Banks typically extend credit by opening
demand deposit accounts in the borrower's name. A percentage of the total
loan, it is stipulated, will be kept on deposit at all times. The precise loan
percentage a bank will require to be kept on deposit, while independent
of federal regulation, is unquestionably a price factor and influences a
borrower's selection among competing banks.
Notwithstanding the vigorous nature of banking competition, the
Government has taken the attitude that bank power, if left unsupervised,
invites revival of the naked restraints, abuses, and exclusionary practices
exposed in the Pujo Money Trust Investigation of 1912, which led to the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System.39 Just a half century ago,
when Congressman Pujo's committee had occasion to investigate the concentration of control over money and credit, its findings disclosed that the
processes of competition were throttled in favor of collusion, combination,
and concentration. The committee saw widespread merger and consolidation of competing banks, achieved through acquisition of competitors'
stock by powerful interests. The committee noted the formation of confederations of competing banks in a system of interlocking directorates
and recognized the influence of the more powerful banking houses in the
management of industrial corporations. It exposed ventures undertaken by
a few select banking houses to purchase controlling interests in mammoth
industrial concems.40
Today, even in spite of federal regulation, it appears that some bank
conduct raises serious questions under traditional antitrust analysis.
Through the expedient of the clearing house, competing bankers tend to
"arrange" the hours of operation, the service charges to be e.xacted on
special accounts, and the interest to be paid on time deposits.41 Competition
from non-commercial bank sources-savings and loan associations, mutual
37 See principal case at 328. The Federal Reserve Board exclusively fixes the rediscount
rate at which member banks discount commercial paper. An increase in the rate means
an increase in the costs of borrowing at the Federal Reserve by a member bank.
Conversely, a decrease in the rate means a decrease in the cost to member banks of
federal credit. Such changes obviously control the "prime" interest rate-the price
member banks charge their best customers.
38 See Transcript 1778.
39 See note 34 supra.
40 See Report of the House Committee To Investigate the Concentration of Control
of Money and Credit, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 56 (1913).
41 See ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND CONCENTRATION IN BANKING 25 (1954); cf. United
States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1!11 71020-22
(D. Minn. Feb. 11, 1964).
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savings banks, and finance companies-is severely limited. State statutes place
severe limitations upon savings institutions. Competition afforded by finance
companies is virtually nonexistent, not only because of rate differentials and
service disparities, but also because finance companies derive their capital
from commercial bank loans. It is said that the atmosphere created is a
naturally coercive one wherein finance companies are compelled to make
full disclosure of customers and operations to their potential competitors.42
Antitrust inquiry into the banking industry has never been extensive. For
example, the antitrust agencies have never inquired into bank correspondent
relationships wherein a number of banks participate jointly in the extension
of credit to a single customer and agree upon the rate charged and the
terms exacted. If two shoe companies agreed to supply a purchaser with
his total requirements-the first to supply seventy-five percent and the
second to supply twenty-five percent, with the price fixed by mutual agreement of the two companies-serious antitrust problems would unquestionably be raised. Bank correspondent relationships, however, although seemingly analogous, have never been so analyzed.
The Government has nevertheless created a regulatory antidote to curb
the unfettered excercise of monetary power by individual banks or groups
of banks. The regulatory structure-both federal and state in origin-in
part dates to 1819, when the Court, in McCulloch v. Maryland,43 held that
Congress has the power to charter a bank. Regulation of banks in part
responds to the disclosures of the 1912 Money Trust Investigation, and in
part is the product of the bank failures of the Great Depression and the
Rooseveltian federalism that followed. National banks, for example, are
cl1artered and supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency. Varying state
laws and regulations, the most important of which govern de novo branching intrastate, regulate both state and national banks at the local level.
Most state banks, as well as all national banks, are members of the Federal
Reserve System, the Board of Governors of which possesses broad monetary
and fiscal powers. Federal Reserve member banks are subject to numerous
provisions designed specifically to insure sound banking management. Illustrative are the rules prohibiting member banks from paying interest on
demand deposits,44 paying interest on time or savings deposits in excess
of the rates fixed in Washington,45 or holding for their own account investment securities of any one obligor in an amount greater than ten percent
of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus. 46 With respect to national
banks the ten percent limitation applies to loans as well, 47 and many state
legislatures have extended the ten percent lending limit to state-chartered
banks. More than ninety-five percent of all banks are insured by the Federal
Id. at 16.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
H 49 Stat. 714 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1958).
45 49 Stat. 715 (1935), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371b (Supp. IV, 1963).
46 48 Stat. 165 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1958).
47 ll4 Stat. 451 (l!:106), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1958).
42
43
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Deposit Insurance Corporation. The principal function of the FDIC is to
see that the public is protected by deposit insurance in the event of failure.
From the banks' point of view, however, there runs with the benefit of
confidence that the Government stands surety the burden of frequent and
intensive bank inspections by federal examiners.48
The Court in Philadelphia Bank carefully analyzed the unique nature
of American commercial banking and the nature and extent of regulation
by: all agencies of federal and state government. Taking into account these
factors, it concluded that as to the banking industry, Congress, by imposing
regulatory supervision, did not intend to displace competition and consequently did not repeal applicable antitrust laws:
"Section 7 ... does require . . . that the forces of competition be
allowed to operate within the broad framework of governmental regulation of the industry. The fact that banking is a highly regulated industry critical to the Nation's welfare makes the play of competition
not less important but more so.... [U]nless competition is allowed to
fulfill its role as an economic regulator in the banking industry, the
result may well be even more governmental regulation.'' 49
Congress itself had made the judgment that maintenance of competition
was to be retained as the national policy regarding the banking industry
when it enacted the Bank Merger Act of 1960: 50
"Vigorous competition between strong, aggressive, and sound banks
is highly desirable. Competition in banking takes many forms-competition for deposits by individuals and corporations and by personal
and business depositors; competition for individual, business, and
governmental loans; competition for services of various sorts. Competition for deposits increases the amounts available for loans for the
development and growth of the Nation's industry, and commerce.
Competition for loans gives the borrowers better terms and better service
and furthers the development of industry and commerce. Vigorous
competition in banking stimulates competition in the entire economy,
industry, commerce and trade.'' 51
The ultimate dilemma facing the Court in Philadelphia Bank was how
to walk successfully the tightrope between judicial legislation-reaching a
congressionally unintended result-on the one hand, and judicial impotence-forbearance from doing justice when justice can be done-on the
other. The desirability of applying Clayton Act proscriptions to bank mergers seems evident. Banking is not sacrosanct. Absent the Court's decision,
legislative extension to banks of Clayton Act jurisdiction would have been
See 64 Stat. 882 (1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (Supp. IV, 196!1).
Principal case at 371-72.
64 Stat. 892 (1950), as amended, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963).
H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960); S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 (1959).
48
40
50
51
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unlikely.152 Suppose, however, that Congress intended in 1950 to exclude
assets acquisitions by commercial banks from the ambit of section 7, perhaps
not because it deemed such an exclusion desirable, but because bank influence was such that this was the only way to rally the votes necessary for
passage. Even upon this hypothesis, the tightrope remains. A Court's function is to adjudicate, not legislate. A judicial tour de force, however, is
always most inviting. 58 Remaining only is the admonition of Mr. Justice
Brandeis:
"When a court decides a case upon grounds of public policy, the judges
become, in effect, legislators. The question then involved is no longer
one for lawyers only. It seems fitting, therefore, to inquire whether
this judicial legislation is sound."54
So let it be inquired in Philadelphia Bank.

III.

DEBITS AND CREDITS: THE ECONOMIC RECKONING

PHILIP PRICE: What the Department of Justice is trying to do here is not to
enhance competition but to stifle it. It is trying to make it impossible for two banks
here who have the energy and will to try to go out and meet competition that now
comes from New York to try and serve the members of the business community (in
the larger business community) . .•.55

As if to underscore its holding that the Clayton Act is applicable to
bank mergers, the Court in Philadelphia Bank enunciated two legal doctrines which transcended the specialized factual setting of bank merger
and dispelled some hopes that the Court's decision in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States5 6 seemed to hold for the merger defendant. The first of these
doctrines is a prima fade presumption of unlawfulness where a merger produces a firm controlling thirty percent or more of the relevant market. The
Court tacitly conceded the evidentiary advantage this illegality slide rule
affords the Government: "Such a test lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size makes them inherently
suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue concentration."57
While the Court's language indicates that the presumption is rebuttable
and not conclusive, the dictum appears to contradict Brown Shoe's rule of
52 Representative Celler in 1956 introduced another amendment to § 7 which would
have rendered banks expressly subject to Clayton Act jurisdiction. 102 CoNG. REc. 2109
(1956). The bill passed the House but failed in the Senate. See principal case at 396
(dissenting opinion).
53 Mr. Justice Harlan characterized the Court's holding as a tour de force. Principal
case at 396 (dissenting opinion).
54 Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices, the Competition that Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15,
1913, p. 10.
55 Argument sur Pleadings and Proof by Philip Price, Counsel for Girard Trust
Com Exchange Ban1c, at 179, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 201 F. Supp.
348 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
56 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
57 Principal case at 363.
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reason test for section 7 unlawfulness: "Congress indicated plainly that a
merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its particular
industry."68
The principal impact of the doctrine will be felt at two distinct levels
of inquiry. In a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Government
assumes the burden of proving, among other things, the prima fade illegality, of the challenged merger.69 Previously, prima fade illegality had been
only nebulously defined. The Court's dictum renders these criteria somewhat ,more certain. The dictum, moreover, also alters the burden of proof
at the trial level. In the future, where the merging firms control thirty
percent or more of the relevant market, they will assume the burden at
trial of rebutting the presumption of illegality. The deterrent effect of this
principle upon future mergers is obvious.
The presumption of illegality was not the only new doctrine the Court
was to expound in Philadelphia Bank. An intriguing argument that had
arisen sporadically in section 7 cases was the "better able to compete" defense.
Defendant merging entities would try to justify any perceived anti-competitive effect in the relevant market by advancing the appealing contention
that economies and advantages of size and combination would better enable the merged complex to compete with industry leaders both within
and beyond the relevant market. The doctrine was first advanced-and
flatly rejected-in United States v. Bethlehem Steel. 60 There the defendants,
Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube, urged the court, in
considering the competitive impact of the proposed merger, to take into
account what they termed "certain beneficial aspects," that is, the enhancement of power in the merged complex to compete effectively and vigorously
with U.S. Steel and other industry leaders. Finding this argument untenable,
the court said:
"[T]he argument does not hold up as a matter of law. If the merger
offends the statute in any relevant market, then good motives and even
demonstrable benefits are irrelevant and afford no defense. . . . The
consideration to be accorded to benefits of one kind or another in
one section or another of the country which may flow from a merger
involving a substantial lessening of competition is a matter properly to
be urged upon Congress. It is outside the province of the Court.'' 61
The "better able to compete" defense, which seemed to have been sent
to its demise in Bethlehem-Youngstown, obtained both partial resurrection
and some respectability in Brown Shoe. There the Supreme Court observed:
"When concern as to the Act's breadth was expressed, supporters
of the amendments indicated that it would not impede, for example,
370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
See United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 31 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
oo 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
61 Id. at 617-18.
68
69
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a merger between two small companies to enable the combination to
compete more effectively with larger corporations dominating the relevant market, nor a merger between a corporation which is financially
healthy and a failing one which no longer can be a vital competitive
factor in the market."62
Consequently,
"Congress foresaw that the merger of two large companies or a large and
a small company might violate the Clayton Act while the merger of
two small companies might not, although the share of the market foreclosed be identical, if the purpose of the small companies is to enable
them in combination to compete with larger corporations dominating
the market." 68
Although the Court confined its comments to a situation involving "two
small companies," it concluded that the Brown-Kinney merger would in
all reasonable probability foreclose competition in a substantial share of
the relevant market, and noted not only the presence of the unlawful effect
but the absence of "any countervailing competitive, economic, or social
advantages." 64 This last dictum, coupled with the rationale of the "two
small companies" doctrine, could be said to invite the very argument
rejected in Bethlehem-Youngstown. There are countervailing economic and
social advantages, the defendants in Philadelphia Bank could argue, and
while there may not be "two small companies" in terms of the relevant
market, any local lessening of competition will be more than counterbalanced by the fact that competition will be substantially increased in the
national and international setting. Indeed, in Philadelphia Bank the banks,
relying on Brown Shoe, contended that, even assuming the relevant geographic market was the Philadelphia four-county area, the increased lending limit effected by the merger, together with other economies of scale,
would better enable the merged institution to compete with larger banks
in the New York and international markets. The Court was not impressed:
"[I]t is suggested that the increased lending limit of the resulting bank
will enable it to compete with the large out-of-state banks, particularly
the New York banks, for very large loans. We reject this application
of the concept of 'countervailing power.' ... If anti-competitive effects
in one market could be justified by pro-competitive consequences in
another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would
make it in the end as large as the industry leader." 65
The Court, attempting to harmonize its position with Brown Shoe, went
on to qualify its pronouncement: "This is not a case, plainly, where two
small firms in a market propose to merge in order to be able to compete
62

370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).

68 Id. at 331.
o, Id. at 334.
61S

Principal case at 370.
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more successfully with the leading firms in that market." 66 This dictum
would appear to indicate that the "better able to compete" defense is not
yet defunct and that it will retain some relevancy in a section 7 case where
the merging companies are "two small firms." The Brown Shoe doctrine
of countervailing power, however, has been narrowed in scope of application. Naturally, one is impelled to inquire how small the firms must be.
As to this the Court has been silent. One thing, however, seems clear. Any
general usefulness the "better able to compete" doctrine may have afforded
the typical merger has now been impaired. Unquestionably, however, the
Court has preserved the "two small companies" doctrine as a narrow corridor within which certain consolidations can be justified. Philadelphia Bank
evidently did not concern "two small companies."
IV. NEW VoGuE IN MiscELLANEous AUTHORITY: THE R.EvoLunoN IN
JUDICIAL NOTICE

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: The writing of an opinion always takes weeks and
sometimes months. The most painstaking research and care are involved. Research,
of course, concentrates on relevant legal materials-precedents particularly. But
Supreme Court cases often require some familiarity with history, economics, the
social and other sciences, and authorities in these areas, too, are consulted when
necessary.67

In the course of a two-month trial creating a record of some 3,900 pages,
the Government in Philadelphia Bank offered four economists who testified
to a variety of economic analyses indicating that the merger would, if
consummated, not only eliminate competition between the merging institutions in the Philadelphia four-county area and thereby diminish the number
of alternative banking sources available to the small businessman, 68 but
would also effect an increase in service charges and interest rates,69 trigger
a renewed rash of horizontal mergers in the relevant market, 70 and culminate
in an exportation of capital redounding to the detriment of the Philadelphia
community, whose stream of deposits provided the banks' life blood.71
These witnesses presumably were subjected to pre-trial examination by
counsel for the bank. The record discloses that all were intensively crossexamined as to their qualifications, their familiarity with the Philadelphia
situation, and the underlying facts and assumptions which had led them to
their conclusions. The district court, sometimes adverting to the government
economists by name, sifted this testimony at length and rejected most of
it.72
The Supreme Court, however, did not mention the economic evidence
66

Id. at 370-71.

67 N.Y. Times, Oct. 6,
68 Transcript 1609-10,
69
10
71

72

1963, § 6 (Magazine), p. 102.
1729, 1791, 1795.

Id. at 1982-2049.
Id. at 1796-97.
Id. at 616-17.
See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Barne, 201 F. Supp. 348, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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introduced by either side; instead, it took judicial notice of economic
sources extrinsic to the record. In the section of its opinion entitled "The
Lawfulness of the Proposed Merger under Section 7," the Court cited the
following economic works, among others: Bock, Mergers and Markets
(1960); Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959); Hale and Hale, Market
Power: Size and Shape Under the Sherman Act (1958); and Machlup, The
Economics of Sellers' Competition (1956).73
Kaysen and Turner's work received particular attention. For instance,
the Court followed Kaysen and Turner's view of the relationship between
quantitative market power and section 7 illegality:
"Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling
an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be
enjoined..•.
"Furthermore, the test is fully consonant with economic theory
[citing, inter alia, Kaysen and Turner]." 74
At another point, the Court assessed the significance of quantitative
market power in a merger of two banks producing a single bank controlling
over thirty percent of the commercial banking resources in the Philadelphia
community:
"Without attempting to specify the smallest market share which would
still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that
30% presents that threat [citing, inter alia, Kaysen and Turner, who
suggest that twenty percent should be the line of prima fade unlawfulness]."75
In going on to discuss the cogency of the Kaysen and Turner analysis,
the Court noted: "We intimate no view on the validity of such tests for we
have no need to consider percentages smaller than those in the case at bar,
but we note that such tests are more rigorous than is required to dispose of
the instant case."76
Kaysen and Turner's work advanced a "substantial legislative amendment" to traditional antitrust policy.77 At the outset the authors distinguished
specific acts of misconduct from undue market power. In their view, the
former is a mere manifestation of the latter-the latter being the substantive
evil to be proscribed and the more fundamental enemy of the competitive
73 Principal case at 355 passim. The Court also cited, among others, Bok, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 308-16
(1960); Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 VA.
L. REv. 489, 521-22 (1957); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA.
L. REY. 176, 182 (1955).
7<i Principal case at 363.
75 Id. at 364.
76 Id. at 364 n.41.
77 See KAYSEN &: TURNER, ANTITRusr PoucY xl (1959).
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process.78 They went on to summarize their position by proposing a shift
in legislative antitrust policy and in legislative design: "We propose •..
the reduction of undue market power, whether individually or jointly
possessed; this to be done normally by dissolution, divorcement, or divestiture."79 The thesis is basically this. Present antitrust policy primarily
focuses on unreasonable restraints or practices exclusionary in economic
effect. This policy, Kaysen and Turner contended, is wholly ineffectual in
breaking down undue market power-the breeding ground of "conscious
parallel action," which is the unassailable handmaiden of conspiracy. An
examination of the American economy, the authors argued, discloses
oligopolistic markets in which monopoly power is often effectively exercised
with impunity. Oligopolistic markets consist of two structural subclasses:
first, those in which the top eight firms have at least fifty percent of total
markets sales and the top twenty firms have at least seventy-five percent of
the total market sales; second, those where the eight largest sellers command
a market share of thirty-three percent with the rest of the market relatively
unconcentrated. Applying the goals of antitrust policy to the current
American economy, the authors suggested proscription not only of conduct,
but of excessive concentration of market power. They proposed amendments
to the antitrust laws: first, provisions enabling a direct attack on undue
market power regardless of the absence of conspiracy; and second, severe
limitations upon forms of conduct contributing to or tending to contribute
to undue market power.
The Court's attention to extra-record economic analyses like those of
Kaysen and Turner raises a number of interesting questions. Long before
Philadelphia Bank, economic analysis of market behavior was considered
relevant in merger cases as an aid in applying broad statutory language
to a specific questioned practice. Mr. Justice Brennan, however, went a
step further. By using economic analyses of market structure, he seemed to
accept the thesis of some economists that certain market behavior is
inextricably interwoven with a certain market structure, and that once the
latter is confirmed, the former is presumed without a further factual showing. The implications of this were not long in coming to light. Commissioner
Elman of the Federal Trade Commission, in finding the recent Procter &
Gamble-Clorox merger violative of section 7, cited a string of economic
writings at one point and then noted: "The Supreme Court in the Philadelphia National Bank case by its repeated citation of economic analyses ... has
clearly indicated the propriety of a reviewing tribunal's consideration of
such analyses in reaching its decision in a Section 7 case."80 In spite of
Mr. Justice Brennan's repeated use of economic sources, one may still take
issue with Commissioner Elman's interpretation as to their propriety. The
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 46.
80 Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1[ 16673, at 21568 n.19.
(FTC Dec. 15, 1963).
78
79
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Court in Philadelphia Bank neither used, nor needed to use, the theories
of Kaysen and Turner or any other economists to reach its findings of
section 7 jurisdiction or section 7 violation. Mr. Justice Brennan may have
intended the economic analyses of market structure as a backdrop against
which to view the merger functionally in the light of its particular industry.
Surely Philadelphia Bank embodied the definite factual showing of illegality
required by Brown Shoe. Nowhere did the Court intimate that the rule of
law is now that oligopoly structure is conclusive evidence of a substantial
lessening of competition without a further showing. With the conflicting
inference available, one must accept with caution Commissioner Elman's
conclusion as to the propriety of judicial economics in antitrust cases.
Moreover, if judicial economics is now the law, surely the Court should
restrict itself to the record or more liberally to the record and briefs of
counsel. It does not seem unlikely that counsel for the banks, had they had
ample warning, could have unearthed accredited economic theorists to
take issue with the analyses of Kaysen and Turner and the others cited by
the Court. Not forewarned, however, is to be most out of vogue. The banks'
brief cited cases, statutes, and congressional materials but not one economist. Finally, judicial notice of an economic theory so inconsistent with
the present policy of the antitrust laws that its proponents recommend a
legislative amendment to effectuate its implementation seems suspect as a
judicial tool. If new conditions indeed require that the Government add to
its arsenal such remedial measures as direct attack on oligopoly or proscription per se of all mergers where there will be produced an entity, controlling
an unreasonable market share, the legislature vested with the power and
the facilities to gather all the relevant facts must make such a judgment.
Congress, of course, moves slowly, and it may be appropriate for the Court
to act in compelling circumstances. If the Court makes such a judgment,
however, it should do so openly and unequivocally. It seems strange to
delegate the task by indirection to economists through the dubious expedient of judicial notice.

V.

JUSTICE AND THE COMPTROLLER:

Two

REGIMES IN THE REVOLVING DOOR

JAMES J. SAXON: We believe it to be incumbent upon the bank supervisory agencies
to institute studies aimed at developing proper standards to insure adequate competition in banking. It is the banking agencies alone that have the facilities, the background knowledge, the constant concern with the adequacy of banking to serve the
financial needs of government and industry, as well as the understanding of the
monetary and fiscal policies and problems of the nation necessary to adequate
consideration of this matter.Bl

The enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, coupled with the
Philadelphia Bank decision, has created an anomalous situation in public
regulation of bank mergers. The vesting of concurrent jurisdiction over
81 Opinion by James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, denying application to
merge, The First National City Bank of New York and The National Bank of Westchester,
White Plains, New York at p. 14 (Dec. 19, 1961).
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bank mergers in a vigorous enforcement agency-the Department of
Justice-on the one hand, and a permissive administrative agency-the
Comptroller of the Currency-on the other, only invites the clash of two
regimes. Manifestly, this imbroglio came to pass because Congress in 1960
took it for granted that by nothing under the sun short of a tour de force
could the Clayton Act be made applicable to banks. 82 The result is a
thicket of legislative intendment. The situation is further snarled by the
Comptroller's conclusion in the recent Crocker-Anglo National Bank
merger approval that Philadelphia Bank requires him to apply Clayton
Act tests to merger applications under the effect-on-competition provision
in the Bank Merger Act of 1960.83 The Court in Philadelphia Bank, however, construed one statute and one statute only in the process of finding
illegality-section 7 of the Clayton Act. Part of the reasoning, of course,
is that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 did not repeal by implication Clayton
Act section 7 in directing the Comptroller to consider the competitive
factor "in passing"-as one of six strands comprising "the public interest."
Nowhere did the Court intimate that the Comptroller was to apply section
7 tests under the Bank Merger Act. Nowhere did the Court intimate that,
if the Comptroller applied such tests, banking would be thereby relieved of
the operation of Clayton Act section 7.84 Nevertheless, the Comptroller has
undertaken a private reading of Philadelphia Bank. Accentuating the
problem is the fact that when the Comptroller clashes with Justice today,
the dispute is delineated by the same standard, Clayton Act section 7.
This was not the case prior to the Comptroller's decision in Crocker-Anglo.
It would seem then that, from the point of view of effective government,
the Comptroller's view of Philadelphia Bank can only be an apple of
discord.
The Comptroller of the Currency traditionally has taken a permissive
attitude toward bank mergers. At trial in Philadelphia Bank a former acting
Comptroller testified that between 1950 and 1959 his office received approximately 840 merger applications and denied "only a few" because of their
adverse effect upon competition. 85 In recent years the number of mergers
approved by the Comptroller has burgeoned. The Comptroller in 1961 approved seventy-two mergers. In 1962, with the incumbent Comptroller, James
J. Saxon, firmly at the helm in the Treasury Building, the figure soared to
ll0 approvals out of US applications. As of June 28, 1963, Mr. Saxon had
approved 35 applications and disapproved one, with 27 pending.86 He
See note 53 supra.
See Decision of the Comptroller on the Application to Merge Crocker-Anglo
National Bank, San Francisco, California with Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles,
California. Sept. 30, 1963.
84 Indeed, in California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962), the Court clearly indicated otherwise.
85 Testimony of Lewellyn A. Jennings. Transcript, 3405-07.
86 These data have been culled from official reports of the Comptroller of the
Currency. For further statistics see Appendix.
82
83
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consistently has refused to deny a merger application solely on the basis of
the competitive factor even in cases where concentration approaches
Sherman Act dimensions. 87 The Comptroller's permissive merger policy can
be viewed only as part of a general scheme of bank regulation. Mr. Saxon,
for example, has evoked considerable criticism from state bankers for his
liberal propensity to grant national bank charters, as well as his advocacy of
special legislation enabling national banks to branch state-wide regardless of
local law.88 This trifurcated policy of permissiveness can admit of but one
underlying meaning. The Comptroller wants to spur the entry of an increasing number of banks chartered under the federal roof. Once the banks are in,
he wants them to be institutions of great strength, the only check on their
power being his own regulatory authority. This he proposes to effect by allowing easy entry, ease of expansion by de novo branching, and ease of growth
by merger or acquisition. This stand is buttressed by the jurisdictional
language of the Bank Merger Act. The consent to merge is within the
jurisdiction of the Comptroller if and only if the resulting bank is a
national bank.
The Comptroller can justify his attempt to expand his regulatory power
by an appealing economic and administrative argument. Banking, as noted
earlier, is a heavily regulated industry. This provides the basis for a salient
economic distinction. One of the Comptroller's chief economists has contended:
"The antitrust laws are an integral part of a public policy which
places essential reliance upon private decision making. . . . In the
regulated industry of banking the reverse is true. Public intercession
in the decision making process takes place at each stage of bank formation and expansion through branching or merger. Private entrepreneurs
are not permitted to enter the banking industry without the consent
of the public authorities. Where they are allowed to enter, they may
branch or merge only with the approval of the public authorities." 89
The thesis is thus developed. The market structure itself is under the
exclusive aegis of the regulator and is not determined by decisions of
individual entrepreneurs. Therefore, it is misleading and erroneous to speak
of competition in an antitrust sense within the context of the regulated
banking industry. The degree of competition, indeed the very market
structure, is a creature of state planning and, as such, should not be
cognizable under Clayton Act tests.
87 See, e.g., Denial of Application To Merge The First National City Bank of New York
and The National Bank of Westchester, White Plains 14-24 (Dec. 19, 1961).
88 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1963, p. 47, col. 5, where Norris E. Hartwell, President
of the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks, criticizes the Comptroller's
policies and charges that the Comptroller does the bidding of the banks he regulates.
80 Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation, National Banking Rev.
Sept. 1963, pp. 101-02. Mr. Abramson is the Director, Department of Banking and
Economic Research, Comptroller of the Currency.
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The Supreme Court, however, has spoken in Philadelphia Bank. As the
Comptroller understands the decision, his duty is to apply Clayton Act
tests under the Bank Merger Act. This, however, will not change basic
merger policy, for the Comptroller is not the Department of Justice.
Justice's duty is to bring all the lawsuits its facilities will allow, to test the
"outer limits" of the antitrust laws, and to press for their applicability to
any and all new industries and situations where the courts might decide
that competition is endangered unlawfully. Of course, the Comptroller
will not read Philadelphia Bank as divesting him of jurisdiction over the
competitive consequences of a given merger, but instead will continue to
fulfill his statutory duty to pass upon merger applications.
Justice would take a diametrically opposite view. The Comptroller, it
is argued, is not really the exclusive regulator of entry into the industry.
To begin with, for the nonce at least, entry is regulated by state authority
as well. Besides, regulation does not fully displace individual initiative.
The Comptroller indeed holds veto power, and while it is conceded that
he may block entry, no policy of permissiveness, however promulgated, will
spur individual entrepreneurs to enter a market in which merger has created
undue concentration. The Comptroller has conceded his own impotence
with respect to stimulation of market entry. Testifying before the House
Committee on Banking and Currency hearings on the conflict of federal
and state banking laws, he said:
"There is one broad area, however, in which the initiative has had
to rest primarily with the banks themselves. This area concerns the
competitive conditions which will prevail in the banking industry.
We have the authority to pass upon applications for new national
charters, for the establishment of new branches by national banks, and
for the merger of existing institutions. But we do not have, nor do we
seek, the authority to initiate such applications." 90
Entry, the Comptroller has correctly stated, is not a creature of regulatory
authority, as his economists claim; it is entirely dependent upon the
existence of a market amenable to further competition. Whether there is
to be entry rests upon private decision. I£ there is to be any opportunity
for entry, competition in an antitrust sense must be preserved. The Comptroller may apply Clayton Act tests under the Bank Merger Act. Surely
there is nothing in RCA or California which suggests he may not so do. But
in California the Court clearly stated that the ultimate administration of
the antitrust laws is exclusively vested in the courts: "Our function is to
see that the policy entrusted to the courts is not frustrated by an administrative agency." 91 I£ the Comptroller continues an attitude of permissive90 Statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, to Hearings Before the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (196!1).
91 California v. FPC, !169 U.S. 482, 490 (1962).
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ness, notwithstanding his application of Clayton Act tests, complaints will
issue from the Antitrust Division.92
While the clash between Justice and the Comptroller has yet to
produce a victor, it has conceived two minor skirmishes, neither of which
appears to have affected the existing stalemate. On August 9, 1963, the
Comptroller approved the merger of the 48.3 million dollar Calumet
National Bank of Hammond, Indiana, and the 42.9 million dollar Mercantile
National Bank, also of Hammond.93 Calumet was the largest bank in
Hammond, with 43 percent of the deposits and 37 percent of the loans;
Mercantile, the second largest, with 37 percent of the deposits and 44 percent
of the loans. The merged bank would have over 80 percent of Hammond's
commercial banking business. In analyzing the competitive factor under
section 7, the Comptroller produced an interesting piece of legal legerdemain. Philadelphia Bank, he reasoned, determined that section 7 applies
to bank mergers. Philadelphia Bank relied upon Brown Shoe. Quoting
Brown Shoe, the Comptroller stated:
"[T]hat 'Congress recognized the stimulation to competition that might
flow from particular mergers' and ..• 'Congress foresaw that the merger
of two large companies or a large and a small company might violate
the Clayton Act while the merger of two small companies might not ...
if the purpose of the small companies is to enable them in combination
to compete with larger corporations dominating the market.' The
instant merger is just such a case."94
The Comptroller seems to have forgotten that the Court in Philadelphia
Bank narrowly interpreted this Brown Shoe doctrine.95 Justice, however,
had a better memory. On October 10, 1963, the Attorney-General filed a
complaint in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that the merger
violated not only section 7, but also Sherman Act section I.96 Shortly
thereafter the banks abandoned their plan to merge.97
Justice, however, has not always triumphed. On May 13, 1963, CrockerAnglo National Bank of San Francisco, fifth largest in California, with
2.3 billion dollars in assets, and Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles, sixth
largest with 775 million dollars, sought the Comptroller's consent to merge.
California is a unique banking state. State-wide branch banking is permitted and practiced. Concentration since the mid-1930's has been unusually
high, with the largest bank holding 39.5 percent of the deposits in the state,
the three largest, 63.5 percent, and the five largest, 78.6 percent. Crocker92 The representations herein of the views of the Comptroller and the Department
of Justice are based on a series of interviews the author had with officials in both
departments, Nov. 5-7, 1963.
03 See Decision of the Comptroller, Aug. 9, 1963.
94 Id. at 5.
95 See discussion of countervailing power in Part III supra.
96 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 45063 (N.D. Ind. Oct. IO, 1963).
117 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1963, p. 65, col. 3.
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Anglo controlled 7.2 percent of the deposits; Citizens National, 2.5 percent.
The merged complex would be fourth in the state; it would control 9.7
percent of the banking resources in California. The case presented an
interesting question under the Clayton Act, since the two banks, although
both within California, did not have offices or branches in the same
counties. Citizens National had 78 banking offices in five southern California
counties. Crocker-Anglo had 124 banking offices in 29 counties sweeping
from northernmost Siskiyou County to southern Santa Barbara County,
over four hundred miles away. Three Citizens National counties-Ventura,
Los Angeles, and San Bernadina-are contiguous to three Crocker-Anglo
counties-Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Kem-with the nearest
offices of the merging banks less than 50 miles apart. At the hearing before
the Comptroller it was adduced that the banks had 140 common depositors.
In passing on the merger, the Comptroller was quick to distinguish
the Crocker-Anglo case from the competitive situation in Philadelphia Bank.
In Philadelphia Bank, competition between the merging institutions was
real and direct; in Crocker-Anglo, competition was inchoate and potential
only. Philadelphia and Girard were respectively second and third in the
relevant market; Crocker-Anglo and Citizens were fifth and sixth. Philadelphia and Girard were situated in close proximity and operated their
branches in a contiguous four-county area; Crocker-Anglo and Citizens
maintained their principal offices in different cities over 400 miles apart.
The merger, the Comptroller concluded, would not foreclose banking
alternatives to the small borrower or depositor. Its consummation would be
in the public interest. The application was approved September 30, 1963.98
On October 8, 1963, the Department of Justice sought to enjoin the
merger.99 Justice proceeded upon three theories: first, the merged complex
would amass vastly increased resources, thereby redounding to the detriment
of the banks' smaller competitors; second, actual and potential competition
between Crocker-Anglo and Citizens would be eliminated in that, but for
the merger, Crocker-Anglo would branch southward and compete with
Citizens National for the rich deposit preserves of the populous San
Joaquin Valley; third, competition in California commercial banking would
be substantially lessened. On November 1, 1963, a three-judge district court,
in a per curiam opinion, denied the Government's motion for a preliminary
injunction during pendency.100 The court, like the Comptroller, distinguished the market situation from that of Philadelphia Bank. The court
reasoned that the actual competition involving each bank is with other
banks and not inter se, as was the case in Philadelphia Bank. The Government's "foreclosure of potential competition" theory, it was determined,
is not tenable in that local conditions suggested no reasonable probability
that, but for the merger, Crocker-Anglo would branch south of the
98 See note 83 supra.
99 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)

,f 45063 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1963).
100 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ,f 70934 (N.D. Cal. Nov. I, 1963).
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Tehachapi Mountains to compete with Citizens National.101 Upon the
denial of the preliminary injunction the banks consummated the merger.102
The Government has announced it will go to trial on the merits, perhaps
with the additional burden of asking the court to design a remedy which
will unscramble the omelet and at the same time restore the competitive
situation as it existed prior to consummation.
At trial the government will face the problem of producing a specific
theory to support its broad allegations. It appears possible, for example,
to argue that the merger will result in a substantial potential "vertical
foreclosure" of other banks in the relevant market. National banks, as
previously pointed out, are limited in the amount they can lend any one
obligor to a sum equal to IO percent of unimpaired capital and surplus.103
When a borrower seeks funds in excess of the lending limit, and sometimes
even where this is not the case, the originating bank arranges a lending
participation with correspondent banks-sometimes as many as 14 or 15who assume the risk pro tanto and extend the loan. As of February 28, 1963,
Citizens National, the smaller bank, had unimpaired capital and surplus of
46.5 million dollars. This means that the bank's lending limit was approximately 4.6 million dollars. The Government may be able to marshal facts
disclosing that Citizens National typically entered into a substantial number
of correspondent relationships with other California banks competing
directly with Crocker-Anglo for such participations. The merger, it might
be demonstrated, would foreclose these banks because, by virtue of the
increased lending limit and enlarged sphere of geographical influence effected
by the merger, the merged entity would no longer enter into such participations. In other words, by swallowing Citizens National, Crocker-Anglo
potentially will cease to compete with other California banks for correspondent relationships. The same argument is equally applicable to competitors
of Citizens National who, but for the merger, would be correspondents of
Crocker-Anglo. In view of Crocker-Anglo's already high lending limit of
14.8 million dollars, however, such foreclosure may not be substantial.
Whether there is evidence of a substantial number of such "vertical" participations so as to sustain the argument, is a question that can be resolved
only at trial. 104 The problem for the merged bank is that the denial of the
preliminary injunction hardly ends the uncertainty of doing business during
pendency of trial on the merits.

•

•

•

It seems that of all the controversial effects flowing from the Philadelphia
Bank decision, the conflict between Justice and the Comptroller is the least
Id. at 78723.
See Fortune, Dec. 1963, p. 217.
See note 46 supra.
In approving the merger the Comptroller considered the probable anti-competitive
effects on correspondent relationships of the merging banks, but he dismissed such effects
as insubstantial. Decision of the Comptroller on the Application To Merge Crocker-Anglo
National Bank, San Francisco, California with Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles,
California, Sept. 30, 1963.
101
102
103
104
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salutary. The applicability of section 7, while it may not be good law, seems
to be sound policy. The birth of the thirty percent presumption of illegality
and the neutralization of the "better able to compete" defense of countervailing power seem rules of convenience designed to reduce unnecessary
protraction of a trial without impairing consideration of all relevant factors.
The supervention of the antitrust laws upon administrative approval based
upon a vague public interest standard has support in Supreme Court
precedent. To rule otherwise is to invite a lack of harmonization in the
accommodation of two sets of laws. The Court's decision, however, should
certainly not be taken to mean that, if the Comptroller applies Clayton
Act tests and approves the merger, the transaction deserves less scrupulous
scrutiny from the judge.
Philadelphia Bank, even its opponents will concede, was a decision that
addressed itself to the future. The Department of Justice may easily accept
the decision as a mandate for more vigorous enforcement of section 7.
Justice and the FTC may read the Court's opinion as an invitation to test
new situations under the expanded jurisdiction of section 7.105 Philadelphia
Bank in conjunction with Brown Shoe may well invite antitrust scrutiny of
correspondent relationships and loan participations where banks separated
geographically like Crock.er-Anglo and Citizens National seek to merge.
However, the decision, because decided under Clayton Act section 7, should
not preclude a test of bank mergers under Sherman Act section I.106
Finally, the decision should stimulate the legislator and the administrator
to coordinate regulatory policy with the prosecution of the antitrust laws.
For, as Philadelphia Bank and subsequent cases so clearly demonstrate, the
statutory thick.et regulating the banking industry has become so dense that
the situation merits re-examination and reappraisal by the Congress.

James D. Zirin
APPENDIX
THE MERGER PICTURE, 1962-63
I. Summary of Comptroller's decisions on bank merger applications. Data is taken from
1963, 1964 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP.
A. Mergers: January I, 1962-December 31, 1962
Approved by Comptroller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 110
Denied by Comptroller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Withdrawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . •
1
B. Mergers: January 1, 1963-June 28, 1963
Applications
.~pplications pending as of January 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . • 16
Applications received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . • 48
Total •....................... • • •· .. • •·· • - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . ... . 64
105 See Procter &: Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REc. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ,i 16673 (FTC
Dec. 15, 1963).
106 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., probable jurisdiction
noted, 374 U.S. 824 (1963).
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Disposition
Approved • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .
Disapproved • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .
Withdrawn • • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pending • . •• •• •• . . . . .. . . .• . • . • .. •• .. . . .. ..•... .. .. . . . .. .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total •. . .•• .. • . .•. . •• .. .. . . . .•• . . • . . .• . •. .• . .. . . . . . . ... .••.•.... .. . . ••. . .. ..

35
1
1
27
64

II. The following are tabular representations of the comments of the Department of
Justice, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on
bank absorption applications passed on by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1962. The
terminology is that of the individual agencies. Data is taken from 1963 COMPTROLLER OF
THE CtnulENCY ANN. REP.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

A. Department of Justice
Favorable ...•...........•.............................•..............
No adverse effect .....•......••....•.....................••........•.•
Not substantially adverse •...•........•................................
Slightly adverse .......•.•..•........•......•..•........•...••..•...••
Adverse effect ••..•••.....•..•.....•..•.•...............•...••.....•.•
Significantly adverse •...••.••..•...•....•...............•....•....••..
Substantially adverse •••••••.••••••..•..••••.•.........................
Substantially adverse and serious anti-competitive effect •.....•.........
Threat of litigation •....•••...••................................•.....
Total .....................••..........•.........................•.

0

12
37
3
26
3
34
7
1
115 [sic]

B. Federal Reserve Board
1. Will increase competition •.•.............•............................
2. May increase competition ••......••..............................••••.
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ..........•.................

6
1

3. No adverse effect on competition .•....................................
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ........................... .

30
3

4. No serious adverse effect on competition ........................•...•...
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ....•••.................•.••

2
1

5. Will have little adverse effect on competition ..........................•
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) .•..............•..•........

12
9

4
7

33
3

6. Probably no adverse effect on competition •............................
7. Might have adverse effect on two parties involved ..................... .
8. Might have adverse effect on competition .................•............
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ........•..................•

21
2
2

4
2
6

9. Will eliminate competition between two banks, exposing remaining banks
to greater competition •.•..•.••....•...............•..............
{with caveat of trend toward concentration) ..•.••.....•...•...•........

3

10. Will eliminate some competition ••............•.•...............•....•
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ...........................•

6
6

11. Will eliminate substantial competition ............•...................
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) .....•.••.............•....•

4
2

8

11

12, Will have adverse effect on competition •••••.......................•...
13. Will eliminate present and potential competition .•...•............•..••
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) .................•..........
14. '\Vill result in concentration .......................................•..
Total ••..•....•••••...............................................•

12
6
2
3
2
5
1
115
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C. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

I. Enhancement of competition • • • . . . • . • . • . • . • . • . . • . . • • • • • . • • . . • . • • • • . . • •

1

2. Overall effect on competition would not be unfavorable . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
3. No effect on competition • • . • • • • • • • . • • • . • • . . • . • • . . • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • •
4. No adverse effect on competition • • • . • • . • • • . • . • • • . • . . • . . • • • . . • • • . • • • • • •
5. Appears unfavorable • • • . . . . • . . . . • . • . . • . . • • . . • • • • • . . • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • •
6. Effect would be unfavorable • • • . • . • • • • • • • . • . . • . • . • . • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • . . • . •
Total..............................................................

102

2
1
1
8
115

TRANSFER OF OPERATING RIGHTS
Traditional public utilities have certain economic characteristics which
engender the creation of monopoly franchises and the imposition of
stringent economic regulation. Such enterprises have a "natural monopoly."1 That is, the technology of the industry is such that unregulated competition will lead to the establishment of a single enterprise in a given
market. These industries are characterized by huge capital investment, the
allocated cost of which is large in proportion to the total costs of production. Plant and equipment are highly specialized as to function and use.
Because of economies of scale, service may be provided at a decreasing unit
cost for greater volume of output up to the total demand in the market. In
competition, the firm with the lowest unit costs will lower rates to a point
at which competitors will be forced to cease operations in order to minimize
losses. Thus, competition is inevitably destructive in such cases. Entry of
new firms is discouraged by the high cost of entry and the danger of loss of
the specialized equipment and plant. In such industries the grant of a
monopoly franchise by the government leads to orderly construction of
facilities; ideally, government regulation of the monopoly firm also protects consumers.
Not all industries under regulation by government bodies fit this description, nor are all treated as monopolies. Neither air carriers under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board,2 nor motor carriers of property
under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,3 nor radio
and television broadcasting stations under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission4 conform to the monopoly model. Generally
l See generally BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 10-13 (1961).
2 There are some economies of scale in air transport, but they fall far short of the
economies of scale in a traditional utility. See CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS
55-83 (1962); FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 17-19
(1961); MEYER, PECK, STENASON &: ZWICK, COMPETffiON IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES
228 (1960).
3 Motor trucking is generally thought to have no significant economies of scale. See
FULDA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9-11; MEYER, PECK, STENASON &: ZWICK, op. cit. supra note
2, at 94-97; Pegrum, The Economic Basis of Public Policy for Motor Transport, 28 LAND
EcoN. 244 (1952). Because of considerations peculiar to the carriage of passengers, regulation of passenger carriers will not be considered in this comment
4 Classification of the broa~casting in~ustry has been difficult. See BoNBRIGHT, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 3. But, assuming the ex.istence of networks, there are no operating cost
advantages to be derived from ownership of more than one station.
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the business units in these industries face significant competition both from
other members of the same industry in the same market and from members
of other industries which provide substitutable services. Yet entry of new
competitors is limited, to a greater or lesser degree, by the government
agency which regulates the industry. 5
The economic regulation of the CAB extends to all air carriers engaged
in interstate air transportation. No enterprise can operate as a common
carrier of passengers or property for hire across state lines without Board
authorization. 6 The requirement of authorization is enforced by both civil
and criminal sanctions.7 Thus entry into the business of interstate air carriage-and geographical expansion of such an existing business-is limited
by government control as well as by economic forces. Similarly, motor carriers, to engage in interstate operations, must have a valid authorization
issued by the ICC,8 and commercial radio and television stations can broadcast only with permission of the FCC.9 Necessary licenses, permits, or certificates can be obtained through original grant or by transfer from the
holder of an existing certificate. This comment will consider the policies
of the FCC, the ICC, and CAB regarding the transfer of rights to operate
within their respective jurisdictions.
I.

TRANSFER OF BROADCASTING STATION LICENSES

There is an active market in transfers of rights to operate broadcasting
stations. The absolute number of transfers which come before the FCC for
approval each year and the number of transfers as a percentage of all stations are high and have been so for a number of years. 10 Many of these
transfers involve substantial consideration, often considerably in excess of
the value of the physical properties transferred_ll More than thirty brokers
5 See generally FULDA, op. cit. supra note 2; Hale&: Hale, Competition or Control III:
Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 775 (1960); Hale &: Hale, Competition or Control II:
Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1959).
6 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 40l(a), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 137I(a) (1958). Under
§ 416 the Board has the power to classify and exempt air carriers. 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1386 (1958).
7 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 902, 1007, 72 Stat. 784, 796, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472,
1487 (1958).
B Motor Carrier Act § 203(c), 49 Stat. 544 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1958).
9 Communications Act of 1934, § 301, 48 Stat. 1081, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
10 The number of applications for transfers of AM, FM, TV, and auxiliary stations has
not been less than one thousand in any year since 1955. See 19-28 FCC ANN. REPs. (19531962). Those involving substantial consideration are probably few more than half of the
total. See EM.ERY, BROADCASrING AND GOVERNMENT 467 (1961). The number of station transfers each year is about 20% of the total number of licenses outstanding. See 23 P &: F
RAmo REcs. 1503, 1516 (1962) (report and order of the FCC adding "trafficking" regulations).
11 In 1962, a New York City AM station was sold for $10.9 million, and a half-interest
in a Pittsburgh television station for $10.6 million. 28 FCC ANN. REP. 56 (1962). Average
prices are somewhat less. See EMERY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 467; Broadcasting, Feb. 15,
1960, p. 80. However, television station facilities cost only from 250 thousand to one million
dollars to construct. FCC Network Study Staff, Network Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Network Broadcasting Report].
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are actively engaged in soliciting purchases and sales of such operating
licenses.12
A. Statutory Standards for License Transfers
Section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 193413 forbids transfers of
station licenses except upon a finding by the FCC that the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" will be served thereby. A 1952 amendment to
the section forecloses consideration by the Commission of whether the
public interest would be better served by a transfer to a person other than
the proposed transferee.14 The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate
the so-called AVCO rule, which provided for a comparative hearing before
the FCC involving all qualified applicants prepared to meet the proposed
transferor's terms of contract.15 Repeal of this amendment has been urged
by the FCC, although apparently not with the intention of reviving the
AVCO rule.16 Legislative proposals to repeal this amendment to 310(b)
have not been successful.17
B. FCC Policy Regarding License Transfers

The FCC has long been wrestling with the problem of evolving standards to govern the transfer of certificates. Foreclosed by the statute from
requiring a comparative hearing on transfer applications, the Commission
rarely has formal hearings of any type on transfers.18 Assuming that the
prospective transferee meets minimum citizenship, character, financial, and
technical qualifications, a propo~ed transfer is generally approved without
serious objection. 19 The sale price is not important in determining the
Broadcasting, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 80.
48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1958).
14 66 Stat. 716 (1952).
15 S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1951). The FCC had already repealed the
AVCO rule in 1949. 14 Fed. Reg. 3235 (1949). The AVCO rule got its name from Powel
Crosley, Jr., 11 F.C.C. 3 (1945), which involved The Aviation Corporation as transferee
of the rights in question.
16 Letter and Enclosed Statement from Chairman E. William Henry to Speaker John
W. McCormack, June 27, 1963, in I P 8: F RADIO R.Ecs. 10-71. Without wishing to reinstate
the AVCO rule, the FCC wants more flexibility to deal with transfer problems.
17 Neither H.R. 11340, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), nor H.R. 1165, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961), was reported out of committee.
18 Seven proposed transfers (five involving FM stations) reached hearing in fiscal
1962. 28 FCC ANN. REP. 20 (1962). None reached hearing in fiscal 1961. 27 FCC ANN. REP.
18 (1961). The latter is probably a more typical year. See Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, pt.
2, vol. I, at 3228-30 (1957) (Chairman Mcconnaughey testifying that hearings on transfers and sales are almost nonexistent).
19 Section 310(b), governing transfers, states that the Commission shall dispose of the
application as if the proposed transferee were making application under § 308 for an
original license. Communications Act of 1934, § 310(b), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 310(b) (1958). Section 308(b) instructs the Commission to consider the citizenship,
character, financial, and technical qualifications of the applicant. 48 Stat. 1086 (1934),
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1958); see § 319(a), 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (1958).
12

13
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legality of the transfer, regardless of its relationship to the value of the
physical property involved.20 All the energies of the Commission have been
directed at the problem of so-called "trafficking" in licenses-basically, the
practice of procuring licenses for the purpose of sale at a profit.21 The
efforts devoted to this problem have diverted attention from more important issues raised by FCC policy.
C.

Competition in the Broadcasting Industry

There is available only a limited number of television stations of commercial importance. From 1948 to 1952, the FCC "froze" television authorizations in order to devise a master plan for the allocation of television
broadcasting frequencies. 22 By the time the freeze was lifted, the FCC had
set aside for commercial television purposes far more channels on the UHF
portion of the band than on the VHF portion.23 However, by 1952 VHF
had achieved great competitive advantages. No UHF station had been commercially broadcasting, and the viewing public had in its hands more than
seventeen million television sets incapable of receiving UHF signals.24 In
addition, UHF has a slightly shorter range of transmission than VHF, although the picture received is equally good.25 Advertisers, of course, prefer
to patronize stations which reach wider audiences, and thus the commercial
significance of UHF stations has been stunted. Although much lamented,
the situation is unlikely to be improved markedly in the near future. 26
20 See, e.g., Wrather-Alvarez, Inc., 10 P 8: F RADIO REcs. 539 (1953); Edward J.
Noble, 11 F.C.C. 569 (1946).
21 In addition to concern long expressed by the FCC, criticism of trafficking has
come from congressional sources as well as others. H.R. REP. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 39-40 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1959); Hearings on the

Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 2908-90

(1958); Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351 (1955). These sentiments led to promulgation in 1962 by the
FCC of special rules aimed at curbing transfers of certificates that have been procured
for the purpose of sale. With certain exceptions, a formal hearing is required in every case
with respect to application for consent to the transfer of the license of a station which
bas been operated by the proposed transferor for less than three years. 47 C.F.R. § 1.365
(Cum. Supp. 1963). The principal exceptions are for death, disability, unavailability of
capital, or other changed circumstances. 47 C.F.R. § 1.365(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
Presumably the purpose of the hearing will be determination of the motive of the
transferor in acquiring the license, and, if the motive is sale or resale, the application for
transfer will be denied.
22 13 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1948) (the "freeze" order); 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952) (lifting the
"freeze'). See generally Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1578 (1962).
23 Seventy of the eighty-two channels set aside for commercial television are on the
UHF (ultra-high frequency) portion of the band, leaving twelve VHF (very-high frequency)
channels. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG.,
lsr SESS., MEMORANDUM ON TELEVISION NETWORK REGULATION AND THE UHF PROBLEM
5 (Comm. Print 1955).
2, Id. at 3.
25 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG.,
lsr SESS., PROGRESS REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF TELEVISION NETWORKS AND THE UHF-VHF
PROBLEM 6 (Comm. Print 1955). UHF stations face other technical and economic problems.
Id. at 6-8.
26 In 1962 the Communications Act was amended to provide the FCC with atJthority
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VHF stations still dominate the commercial market, and, since most of these
stations have already been allocated, means of entry of new broadcasters
are limited as a practical matter to transfers by purchase from existing
licensees. Therefore, hope for the improvement of television broadcasting
must to a great extent rest on competitive forces. 27 Motion pictures, newspapers, magazines, radio, and other media of mass entertainment and information offer competition. Still, competition between television broadcasters is important, and the entry of new individuals with new capital and
fresh ideas into television broadcasting is critical to intramedium competition.
There exists a similar scarcity of commercial radio broadcasting frequencies. There has never been a master plan for the allocation of radio
frequencies. The FCC has promulgated a comprehensive set of general
rules which limit the location, power, and times of transmission on radio
frequencies throughout the country. Any person who is able to discover a
frequency and place to transmit may apply for a license to do so.28 Nevertheless, on AM frequencies-those of greatest commercial importance-the
desirable markets are already well covered by station licenses. Thus, transfer from an existing licensee is the most convenient method of new entry.
D. Significance of the Qualifications and Status of the Transferee
Ordinarily, in the original grant of a station license the FCC has an
opportunity to choose among several applicants who compete in a comparative hearing. The FCC disqualifies at the outset any candidate who
fails to meet minimum character, citizenship, financial, and technical standards,29 and has stated that any applicant who appears in a comparative
hearing would be awarded the license if he were the sole applicant. 30 In
the comparative hearing itself, the applicants are compared with respect
to such additional factors as local ownership,31 integration of management
to require that television receivers shipped in interstate commerce be equipped to receive
all allocated television broadcasting frequencies. Apparatus may not be shipped in
interstate commerce for sale or resale to the public unless it complies with FCC rules.
Pub. L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150 (1962). At about the time of this legislation, only 103
UHF stations were in actual operation, although the FCC bas allocated space for 1,544
UHF stations. On the other band, 500 VHF stations were in operation, although space for
only 681 VHF stations has been allocated. S. REP. No. 1526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
Obviously this legislation is aimed at fostering the development of UHF television, but
it will be some years before the impact is fully felt.

27 Station licenses are not granted in perpetuity, but must be renewed every three
years by the FCC. Communications Act of 1934, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1083, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 307(d) (1958). This provision makes broadcasters sensitive to current FCC policies,
and probably exerts some influence on programming.
28 An applicant for a license must show, among other things, that objectionable interference will not be caused to existing stations or that the need for the new service outweighs
the need for the service lost by the interference. 47 C.F.R. § 3.24(b) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
29 See Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 373 (1957).
30 E.g., Radio Wisconsin, Inc., IO P & F RADIO REcs. 1224 (1955).
31 See, e.g., WBUD, Inc., 32 F.C.C. 915 (1962).
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with ownership,32 diversification of control,33 and broadcasting experience.34 As noted above, the FCC does not conduct comparative hearings
on proposed transfers, and characteristics of the proposed transferee that
would weigh heavily against him in the context of a comparative hearing
do not disqualify him as a transferee. Thus, whatever objectives are served
by selection of licensees on the basis of comparative factors are frustrated
through the transfer process.315
Transfer has been an instrument by which multiple owners, networks,
and owners of competing media have acquired station licenses.36 Multiple
ownership has certainly not barred the acquisition of operating rights by
purchase, although in a comparative hearing a multiple owner must typically overcome issues of local ownership and diversification by countering
with broadcast experience. Multiple ownership enhances bargaining
strength. Generally a multiple owner is in a better position than a single
owner to procure network affiliation and syndication contracts.37 Affiliation
with a particular network is generally limited to one per service area; 38
thus, single owners may be left to choose from less desirable affiliations.
However, as far as the public is concerned, it seems to make little difference
whether the station carrying the programs of a particular network is owned
by a multiple owner or by a single owner. The FCC has proceeded directly
by rule-making to limit multiple ownership,39 and to prevent elimination
of competition in any individual market area.4 Further limitations on

°

See, e.g., Radio Associates, Inc., 32 F.C.C. 166 (1962).
See, e.g., Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 10 P & F RADIO REcs. 1224 (1955).
84 See, e.g., Community Telecasting Corp., 32 F.C.C. 923 (1962).
85 Comparative licensing has been cited as an example of a regulatory activity with
no economic significance. Address by Professor Roger C. Cramton, American Economic
Association Annual Meeting, December 28, 1963, to be printed in 76 AMERICAN EcoNOMIC
AssOClATION, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (1964).
36 Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEO. L.J. 1, 11 n.35 (1961).
Multiple ownership is one of the problems in the general category of diversification of
control. The main danger of multiple ownership is the possibility of misuse of economic
power, mainly over advertisers. Ownership by persons controlling competing media, such
as newspapers, presents broader questions of the diversification of communications media
as a whole. Economic misuse is again a danger, but probably more important is the fear
that such ownership leads to control of thought and opinion. Consideration of these
questions is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally LEVIN, BROADCAST REGULATION
AND JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDlA. (1960); Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest:
Administrative Responsibility and the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957).
37 Network Broadcasting Report 241-43, 564-68; STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERsrATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., lsr SESS., MEMORANDUM ON TELEVISION NETWORK
REGULATION AND THE UHF PROBLEM 39 (Comm. Print 1955).
38 See Network Broadcasting Report 263-78. See also 47 C.F.R. § 3.132 (1958). However,
there is necessarily some overlap. Network Broadcasting Report 216-20.
30 A licensee may not own or control more than seven AM stations, 47 C.F.R. § 3.35(b)
(1958), more than seven FM stations, 47 C.F.R. § 3.240(b) (1958), or more than seven
television stations, only five of which may be on the VHF portion of the band. 47 C.F.R.
§ 3.636(a)(2) (1958). See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
40 The so-called "duopoly" rule provides that no licensee may own or control more
than one television station in "substantially" the "same area." 47 C.F.R. § 3.636(a)(l)
(1958). There are similar restrictions on ownership or control of AM stations, 47 C.F.R.
§ !!.!l5(a) (1958), and FM stations, 47 C.F.R. § 3.240(a) (1958).
32
83

1022

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

ownership, if necessary, can be imposed directly by rule and need not be
imposed indirectly through a policy of refusing to approve transfers to
multiple owners. 41 Networks, as well as non-network multiple owners, have
often developed their systems of owned stations by means of transfer. The
pros and cons of network ownership have been heatedly debated without
any clear consensus emerging. 42 At any rate, it is doubtful that network
owners supply programming of lower quality than non-network owners. 43
Multiple ownership presents problems of diversification of broadcasting media. Other issues are raised by ownership of competing media involving diversification of the media of dissemination as a whole. Owners
of competing media have procured station licenses by means of transfer.
However, the position of the FCC is not even definitive as to original grants
to owners of competing media.44 Criticism of such ownership does not include any complaint that it results in inferior programming.
E.

Significa·nce of the Price Paid for Trans/er of the License

The public does not pay directly for the broadcasting service it receives,45 and the FCC has no rate powers over broadcasting services. The
basic control over the industry is the licensing function. Failure of the
Commission to control prices of transfers has been criticized,46 perhaps
because there is an element of windfall in each transfer of a station license
for substantial consideration. This is truer perhaps of television than of
radio. The right to operate a VHF television station in a large metropolitan area is itself an extremely valuable asset. On the other hand, more
individual broadcasting skill is generally required to develop the exchange
value of a radio station. An important reason is that radio licenses are not
as scarce as VHF licenses. There is also a difference in the nature of radio
and television broadcasting. VHF television stations usually operate with
41

But see Network Broadcasting Report 584-90; Levin, supra note 36.
Network Broadcasting Report 577-82; STAFF OF THE

42 The arguments are summarized in

SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85TH CONG,, 1ST SESS., THE TELEVISION
INQUmY 89-92 (Comm. Print 1957). There are polar extremes of opinion on network
practices generally. Compare STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE NETWORK MONOPOLY (Comm. Print 1956) (prepared
by Senator Bricker), with COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, AN ANALYSIS OF "THE NETWORK
MONOPOLY" (1956). A very large share of total network income is derived from networkowned stations. See 27 FCC ANN. REP. 66 (1961).
43 See COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, op. cit. supra note 42, App. xxxiv-lxvi (1956)
(relating the record for local service of four CBS-owned stations).
44 See LEvm, op. cit. supra note 36; Network Broadcasting Report 106-24; Comment,
66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957). If the FCC could formulate intelligent standards for comparative
hearings regarding diversification, these same standards could be applied by rule to
transfers in order to close the "loophole."
45 Broadcasting revenues, of course, come mainly from the sale of advertising time.
On the arrangements for these sales between networks and affiliated stations, see generally Network Broadcasting Report.
46 Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351 (1955). See Hearings on the Investigation of Regulatory
Commissions & Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 2908-15 (1958).
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a network affiliation which has built-in "viewability."47 Most radio stations
are not affiliated with a network; 48 instead, programming is often geared
to the development of a limited audience, e.g., teen-agers. A radio station
often must seek to develop its own personality with its own shows. Thus,
the transfer of radio stations at high prices results less in a windfall than
does a similar transfer of a television station; radio station transfers have
therefore attracted less attention. 49
High prices are the inevitable consequence of a limited supply when
the market price is free to climb, and high prices stimulate "trafficking" in
station licenses.50 However, the new Commission rules,51 if properly applied, should put an end to at least the most flagrant cases. High prices
are likewise said to install as operators licensees bent on recovering investment through poorer service to the public.52 This is an unlikely consequence. It is a fair assumption that broadcasters are businessmen, and a
businessman maximizing his income over time must provide the service
which will have that effect.53 The limit on poor or obnoxious service is
service of a quality which will cause the FCC to revoke or fail to renew the
Iicense.54 Most licensees operate well within that limit and provide service
which attracts an audience and hence advertisers. The behavior of a licensee in this respect is the same regardless of the price he paid to acquire
the station, because profit maximization is prima facie the goal of every
licensee. The same argument applies to any contention that wealthier
broadcasters can afford to, and do, provide better service.
A prospective license transferee calculates the price he is willing to pay
by capitalizing expected future income. A free market in licenses attracts
the most economically efficient individuals to broadcasting. It is impossible
to say that, as a class, such persons provide less satisfactory service to the
public. The difficulties of the FCC in applying "comparative" factors testifies to the impossibility of formulating objective standards to judge future
broadcasting performance. Probably the soundest means of assuring per47 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG.,
lsr SESS,, INVESTIGATION OF TELEVISION NETWORKS AND THE UHF-VHF PROBLEM 20-21
(Comm. Print 1955).
48 In 1946, 80.8% of the AM stations in operation were affiliated with a network. Since
1946 there has been a trend to non-affiliation, and, by 1956, only 42.7% of the AM
stations were affiliated. Network Broadcasting Report 600-07.
40 It has been suggested that new licenses be auctioned off, and an annual royalty
charge for operations be collected to recapture the franchise value of broadcasting stations.
Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEO. L.J. 1 (1961). See Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & EcoN. I (1959).
50 Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351, 357 (1955).
51 See note 21 supra.
52 SIEPMAN, RAD1o's SECOND CHANCE 165 (1946).
153 Persons who operate stations on commercial channels will generally be forced to
sell the license or provide income-producing programming. The scarcity value of the
license will cause the opportunity cost to rise until non-commercial operations are no
longer feasible.
54 See E. G. Robinson, Jr., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), 47 MINN. L. REv. 465 (1963).
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formance is a free market in licenses. And free entry is at least consistent
with the long-standing FCC policy of encouraging entry and increasing
competition.55

II.

TRANSFER OF MOTOR CARRIER OPERATING RIGHTS

Like broadcasting station licenses, motor carrier certificates and permits
are transferred in an active market. 56 Transfer of property and operating
rights to an existing carrier requires authorization by the ICC under section
5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act57 if the aggregate number of vehicles
involved exceeds twenty. 58 Transfers to non-carriers, or transfers involving
twenty vehicles or less, are excluded from section 5,59 but transfers so excluded must, under section 212(b) of the Motor Carrier Act,60 conform to
rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. 61
A. Section 212(b) Transfer Rules
Regulations promulgated pursuant to section 212(b) apply only to
transactions exempted from section 5. 62 The rules state that a transfer will
generally be approved upon a showing that the proposed transferee is fit,
willing, and able to perform the service and to conform to the act and Commission rules and regulations. 63 The transfer rules, however, contain a number of general bases of disapproval. These include undue division of rights
by the transferor; 64 creation of "duplicating rights" which authorize transportation of passengers, or of the same commodities, between the same
points; 65 and transfer of "dormant rights," where the transferor has ceased
operations for a substantial period of time under circumstances over which
he had control. 66 In addition, the rules provide that a proposed transfer
will be disapproved upon a finding that the transferee does not intend to
engage in bona fide operations, or upon a finding that the transferor procured the rights for the purpose of profiting therefrom without engaging
in bona fide operations. 67 The Interstate Commerce Commission has esSee Network Broadcasting Report 64-105.
The number of applications for approval of transfer, lease, or acquisition exceeds,
on the average, one thousand per year. See ICC, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
ACTIVITIES 1937-1962, at 199 nn.1-3 (1962). Applications for transfer or lease under § 212(b)
alone totaled 870 for fiscal 1962, and 989 for fiscal 1961. 76 ICC ANN. REP. 81 (1962).
57 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1958).
58 Calculation of the number of vehicles involved is discussed in Hagerstown Motor
Express Co., 87 M.C.C. 473 (1960); see 49 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1961).
59 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(10) (1958).
60 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1958).
61 49 C.F.R. pt. 179 (1961); see United States v. Resler, 313 U.S. 57 (1941).
62 49 C.F.R. § 179.l(a) (1961).
63 49 C.F.R. § 179.3 (1961).
64 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(a) (1961).
65 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(d) (1961).
66 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(b) (1961).
67 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(c) (1961).
55

56
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tablished the Transfer Board,68 staffed by Commission employees, to handle
the vast number of applications under 212(b), which rarely reach formal
hearings. 69 The great majority of applications under this section involve
transferees who are not carriers. 70 Thus new enterprises can and do expeditiously enter the motor carrier industry.

Section 5 Trans/ers
Transfers to existing carriers involving more than twenty vehicles are
governed by section 5. 71 The basic statutory test for approval of such acquisitions is consistency with the "public interest." 72 The ICC has stated that
cases under 212(b) do not control applications under section 5. 73 Nevertheless, many of the same considerations apply. For example, the Commission has denied, under section 5, transfers of dormant rights as creating
what is in effect a "new service." 74 The "public interest" as construed by
the ICC is, in the main, the striking of a balance between the interests of
shippers and the parties to the proposed transfer on the one hand, and the
interests of competing carriers on the other. In McLean Trucking Co. v.
United States,15 the Supreme Court sustained the Commission in its approval76 of the consolidation of seven large motor carriers of property into
the largest single carrier of property in the United States. Reviewing the
statutes, the Court concluded:
B.

"In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the
effects of a curtailment of competition which will result from the
proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advantages
of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine
whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the overall transportation policy."77
The Court also granted the Commission broad discretion in resolving these
considerations.
C. End-to-End Mergers

End-to-end mergers of routes are generally approved by the Commission
where there has been substantial "interlining" between the parties prior
68
60
70

See 72 ICC ANN. REP. 122 (1958).
See Morton, Carrier Consolidation, 30 ICC PRAc. J. 425,437 (1963).
ICC, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES 1937-1962, at 200 (1962).
71 See notes 57, 58 supra.
72 Interstate Commerce Act § 5(2)(b), 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(2)(b) (1958).
73 C. H. Hubert, 45 M.C.C. 717, 725 (1947).
74 See McFarland &: Stample Trucking Co., 36 M.C.C. 459 (1941); FULDA, CoMPEITITON
IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 139-42 (1961); Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business on Trucking Mergers and Concentrations, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 280-303 (1957).
7ri 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
76 Associated Transp., Inc., 38 M.C.C. 137 (1942).
77 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944).
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to acquisition. Interlining is a practice by a carrier of transporting property
fo points outside his route area by arrangement with a carrier with routes
going to the destination. Usually the arrangements provide for physical
transfer of the goods to a truck operated by the connecting carrier, or for
lease of the loaded truck by the connecting carrier. In a case where there
is substantial interlining between the parties, acquisition results in better
service to the shipper, greater economies of operation, and minimum diversion of traffic from competing carriers.78 On the other hand, where there is
substantial interlining between the acquiring carrier and carriers not parties to the transaction, the Commission is reluctant to approve an acquisition which will divert the interlining traffic from the connecting carriers.
This principle was illustrated by the Pacific Intermountain Express proceeding.79 P.I.E. was a large carrier operating between the west coast and
Chicago and St. Louis. Keeshin, a slightly smaller carrier in terms of revenue, operated between the midwest and points east. The two firms involved
had little interchange traffic; in fact, P.I.E. interlined most of its freight
with Keeshin's competitors in the east. Twelve motor carriers and several
railroads appeared in opposition to approval. The Commission denied the
application for approval of the acquisition, stating that the proposal "goes
beyond a mere unification of the operations of two going concerns, with
the elimination of interchange formerly carried on between them." 80 It
would create a "new service" depriving existing carriers of transport and
interchange now carried.81 The outcome of later cases before the Commission seems to have hinged on the success of competitors in convincing the
Commission of the adverse effects upon them which would result from the
proposed acquisition.82 The support of shippers for the transaction is similarly important in obtaining approval.83
D. Mergers of Routes Within an Area
Mergers between carriers operating in the same general area are less
common than end-to-end mergers and present a somewhat different problem.84 Such a merger cannot offer the advantages of the elimination of interchange traffic, and it would tend to depress the competitive level by
eliminating a competitor in the area. Where the transaction involves common control of competing carriers, the Commission is reluctant to approve
the application, often referring to a policy of corporate simplification and
to adverse effects of interlocking interests on competition.85 However, when
78 See J. W. Ringsby, 58 M.C.C. 594 (1952).
79

57 M.C.C. 341 (1950), afj'd on reconsideration, 57 M.C.C. 467 (1951).

80 Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 57 M.C.C. 341, 379 (1950).
81 Id. at 380.
82 See Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 377 (D. Colo. 1960),
109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 892 (1961); FULDA, op. cit. supra note 74, at 166 n.D (1961) (collecting
cases).

83 Id. at 132-33.
84 Id. at 142.
85 See W. W. Brown, 39 M.C.C. 373 at 377

(1943).
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the transaction involves a simple merger or purchase, the problem is generally resolved by application of the general criteria outlined in the
McLean Trucking case.sa

E. Significance of the Price Paid for the Trans/er of Operating Rights
The ICC has recognized that the price to be paid for any proposed
transfer is a relevant factor in determining whether the transaction is in
the "public interest."87 In its capacity as overseer of the health of the industry, the ICC is concerned with the financial integrity of the carriers
under its jurisdiction. Therefore, when the Commission feels that the price
will overtax the resources of the acquiring carrier, the application is denied. 88 The problem of the financial integrity of the acquiring carrier can
be mitigated by a showing of sounder route integration, prospective economies of operation, and other indicators of increased future efficiency.89
In addition, the Commission is concerned with the medium of payment as
well as the amount.DO
Shippers pay directly for the service provided, and the ICC has the duty
of supervising the setting of "just and reasonable" rates by the carriers.91
The Commission has shown some, but very little, concern over the possible
consequences the purchase price may have on rates. 92 Perhaps this is a reflection of the highly competitive nature of the trucking business. There
is a great deal of competition between truckers, and from other modes of
transportation, principally rail and water carriers.93 Rate control is often
directed toward the maintenance of minimum rather than maximum rates. 94
Because of the tendency of truckers to cut rates and the general availability
of competitive service, shippers are not in great danger of having the price
of an acquisition passed on to them.95 The price agreed upon by the parties
See text accompanying note 75 supra.
E.g., DeCamp Bus Lines, 58 M.C.C. 667 (1952); see Meck & Bogue, Federal Regulation of Motor Carrier Unification, 50 YALE L.J. 1376, 1397-404 (1941).
88 See Keeshin Transcontinental Freight Lines, Inc., 5 M.C.C. 25 (1937).
80 See Meck & Bogue, supra note 87, at 1399.
90 Section 5(2)(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act directs the Commission to give
weight to the total fixed charges resulting from the transaction. 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49
U.S.C. § 5(2)(c) (1958).
91 It is the duty of every common carrier to set "just and reasonable" rates. Motor
Carrier Act §§ 216(a), 216(b), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(a), 316(b) (1958). The
Commission determines "lawful" rates. Motor Carrier Act § 216(e), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49
U.S.C. § 316(e) (1958).
92 Graves Truck Line, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 371, 375 (1953). But see Middlewest Freightways,
Inc., 58 M.C.C. 647 (1952).
93 Williams, The ICC and the Regulation of Intercarrier Competition, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 1349 (1950).
u Hale & Hale, Competition or Control III: Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 775,
814-15 (1960); see Note, Minimum Rate Regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 73 HARv. L. REv. 762 (1960).
95 A different situation prevails where the route transferred does not offer competitive
service, or where the transfer eliminates competitive service. The Commission, however,
has not adopted a distinction along these lines.
86
87
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to the transfer is generally entitled to great weight and is ordinarily accepted as representing the "reasonable commercial value" of the properties
and operations involved.96 Only prices which are "excessive" 97 or inconsistent with "careful trading" 98 are disapproved. Although the Commission's
position on the valuation of intangible properties is not plain, it is clear
that such intangibles, including operating rights, are entitled to be included
in the fixing of an exchange value. 9 9
Compared to the investment of railroads and water carriers in tangible
property, that of a motor carrier is small. Intangible property, chiefly operating rights, is relatively more important to the total value of a carrier's
business. 100 The Commission plainly feels that strict control of the price of
intangibles would discourage otherwise desirable transfers; 101 thus it is reluctant to disapprove a transfer merely because of price. The motor carrier
industry is characterized by a great mass of routes which are often limited
by inefficient restrictions and are not necessarily well integrated.102 Much
can be done through voluntary transfer of routes to improve the present
route structure and to shift the route structure to meet changing transportation needs. A permissive Commission attitude toward transfers fosters these
objectives.

III.

TRANSFER OF AIRLINE ROUTE AUTHORIZATIONS

Air carrier certificates and permits have not been as freely exchanged as
broadcasting licenses and motor carrier authorizations. Section 40l(h) of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that no certificate of public convenience and necessity may be transferred without approval of the CAB.103
Consolidation, merger, or other transfer of tangible assets likewise requires
approval of the Board under section 408(a) of the act.104 For transactions
involving transfers of tangible assets a formal hearing is required by
statute.105 Because most transfers of routes have involved transfer of
physical assets in the same transaction, a formal hearing is typical. The
standard both for transfer of certificate and for transfer of property is consistency with the "public interest." The act indicates that, for approval of
the· transfer of routes, consistency with the public.interest must appear
affirmatively, whereas, for transfer of assets, approval will be given except
See, e.g., Transport Co., 36 M.C.C. 61, 90 (1940).
Ibid.
98 Keeshin Transcontinental Freight Lines, Inc., 5 M.C.C. 25 (1937).
99 See, e.g., Lee Transp. Co., 13 FED. CAR. CAs. 40306 (ICC 1958).
100 Meck&: Bogue, supra note 87, at 1398.
101 See William M. Graves, 59 M.C.C. 60 (1953); Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 55
M.C.C. 543 (1949).
102 See FuLDA, op. dt. supra note 74, at 92-105.
103 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 137l(h) (1958) (formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
§ 401(i), 52 Stat. 977).
104 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1958).
105 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408(b), 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1958).
96
97
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upon a finding that the transaction is inconsistent with the public interest.
However, this distinction has not been treated as significant by the Board.106
The present domestic route structure is a conglomeration of original
"grandfather" routes and various routes added by the CAB since 1938 as
need for them developed. This has not resulted in the creation of an ideal
system. 107 The Board may alter the route structure through new or additional route certifications, and through refusal to renew temporary certificates, for which re-application must be made. In addition, the CAB has
authority to modify or suspend any certificate if the "public convenience
and necessity so require," 108 as well as the power to revoke certificates for
intentional failure to comply with Board orders or regulations. 109 The
power to suspend has been used sparingly against carriers reluctant to give
up their routes,11° and, because of procedural limitations, it cannot be considered an expeditious method of realigning the route structure. Further•
more, the Board has no power to order mergers, consolidations, or transfers
of routes.111 Thus the ability of carriers to transfer routes under the supervision of the Board is an important means of promoting a sound airline
system.
The Board has passed on a number of cases where the consideration for
the transfer approximately equaled the value of the tangible assets acquired. In such cases, the Board has focused on a number of public interest
factors, not unlike those applied by the ICC. Of course, the buyer must be
fit, willing, and able to provide the service. 112 Beyond that, the Board has
considered the interest of the travelling public in the quality of the service
to be provided113 and the economic interest of competing carriers.114 Always present is the issue of whether the route soundly integrates with the
routes of the acquiring carrier.rns None of the above factors is necessarily
106

101

Byers Ahways, Inc., 23 C.A.B. 428 (1956).
See Landis, Air Routes Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15

J. AIR. L.

&: CoM. 295

(1948).
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 40l(g), 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 137I(g) (1958).
Ibid.
In New England Air Express, Inc., 14 C.A.B. 1132 (1951), a supplemental air
carrier lost its letter of registration (supplementals are not issued certificates) for
"complete disregard" of the rights and welfare of the traveling public. For the difficulties
of altering certificates, see CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961). On the
power to suspend, see United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952).
111 United Airlines, Inc., 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947). The same applies to surface carriers
under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Morton, Carrier Consolidation, 30 ICC PRAC. J. 425, 444 (1963).
112 Alaska Island Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 14 (1947). The Board also considers whether
the transfer will result in a waste of the transferee's assets. Wien Alaska Airlines, 3 C.A.B.
207 (1941); see Thomas E. Gordon, 7 C.A.B. 429 (1946).
113 Wien Alaska Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 207 (1941). The ability of the seller to operate the
route will also be considered. Alaska Island Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 14 (1947).
IH Cordova Air Serv., Inc., 4 C.A.B. 708 (1944).
1111 See Ferguson Airways, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 769 (1947); Western Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 654
(1944); cf. Southwest-W. Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356 (1951). Other factors are
whether the transfer frustrates the purpose of the original grant, Resort Airlines, Inc.,
IA Av. L. REP. ,I21214 (CAB 1961), and whether the type of route is consistent with the
10s
100
110

1030

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

62

determinative of a particular application, nor is there any known limit to
the issues· which may be relevant to a particular transaction. The broad
range of public interest factors which may enter into the determination
often appears in other cases before the Board, such as original certification
cases and renewal cases. By applying the relevant factors to transfer cases,
the Board may assure that transfers will further Board policies rather than
subvert them.
Since passengers and shippers pay directly for the service provided, the
CAB regulates the rates of carriers under its jurisdiction,116 and several
carriers receive subsidies from the federal government,117 the Board must
direct its attention to the price to be paid to determine whether a transaction is in the public interest. Early in its history the CAB evolved three
basic principles: (1) operating rights and other intangibles have an exchange value; (2) the CAB will scrutinize the reasonableness of the consideration; and (3) the portion of the purchase price which exceeds the
value of the tangible assets transferred cannot be added to the investment
base for purposes of rate or mail pay detertninations. With minor variations, the Board has applied these general principles to all transfer cases.
The first major case to come before the Board was Acquisition of
Marquette by TWA in 1940.118 The purchase price of 473,000 dollars was
about fifteen times the value of the assets involved. In refusing to approve
transfer of the certificate, the Board stated: "it would clearly be adverse to
the public interest ... to allow a certificate of public convenience and necessity to be treated as if it were a speculative security, to be sold by the
holder to the highest bidder . . . ." 119 Shortly thereafter, in the Second
Marquette Case, 120 the Board withdrew its harsh language. The price had
been reduced to 313,000 dollars, ten times the value of the assets, and the
transfer was approved. 121 The Board stated: "Further reflection on the
issues raised in this proceeding leads us to the conclusion that in passing
on the reasonableness of the price the Board should take into consideration
all types of value which are in fact elements in the fixing of the exchange
value of the property.'' 122 This statement paved the way for the celebrated
United-Western case.12 a
United had no route directly connecting Los Angeles with the East.
operations of the acquiring carrier, Eastern-Mohawk Transfer Case, IA Av. L. REP. 1!21200
(CAB 1961).
See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(g), 72 Stat. 790, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1958).
See note 139 infra and accompanying text.
2 C.A.B. I (1940).
Id. at 14.
Acquisition of Marquette by TWA-Supplemental Opinion, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940);
see Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 523 (1948).
121 Chairman Landis dissented.
122 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA-Supplemental Opinion, 2 C.A.B. 409, 412
(1940).
123 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947); see Note,
48 COLUM. L. REY. 88 (1948); Note, 15 u. CHI. L. REv. 343 (1948).
116
117
118
119
120
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United did have routes connecting Denver and the East, and Western's
Denver-Los Angeles route provided a convenient hookup to Los Angeles
for United's transcontinental traffic. In 1940, United's attempt to merge
with Western was thwarted by the Board. The CAB felt that it was in the
public interest to preserve Western as an independent carrier in the West. 124
In 1944 the route involved in the sale in question was awarded to Western.125 United was a competing applicant for the route, and was again
frustrated in its attempt to gain direct access to Los Angeles. The principal
reason for denying United's application was that traffic carried on Western's
Salt Lake City-Los Angeles route would be diverted by the award of the
Denver route to United because much of the traffic that Western carried was
interchange traffic with United's transcontinental passengers, and the preservation of Western as a strong independent carrier was in the public interest. Then, in 1947, United arranged to pay Western 3.75 million dollars
for its Denver-Los Angeles route, along with less than two million dollars
worth of equipment. This transfer was approved by the Board.126 The obvious conclusion is that United paid nearly two million dollars to avoid the
impact of earlier Board decisions.127
In decisions subsequent to United-Western, the Board has approved
transfers where the value of intangibles could be calculated as 338,000
dollars (64.4 percent of the total price of the transaction),128 3,012,000
dollars (30.0 percent of the total),129 390,000 dollars,130 and 480,000 dollars
(96.0 percent of the total).131 In one case, the Board approved a sale of
routes and certificates unaccompanied by physical assets at a price of
25,000 dollars. 132 Plainly, the CAB has recognized the exchange value of
route authorizations, but in almost every case the Board has closely examined the reasonableness of price and in general has not felt the approval
of price is a routine matter. In National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control133
the Board refused to approve the acquisition of Caribbean by National
for stock worth 325,000 dollars when the net worth of Caribbean did not
exceed 60,000 dollars. It stated: "We are convinced that an excessive price
paid by an air carrier, in one form or another and in the long run, comes
out of the pockets of the travelling and investing public." 134 In the TWA,
124 United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
125 Western Air Lines, 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944).
126 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).
121 However, several months prior to the decision in the United-Western case, the
Board authorized United to fly between Los Angeles and Chicago and points east. Transcontinental &: W. Air, 8 C.A.B. 28 (1947). This would seem not only to moot the diversion
issue, but also to achieve United's main purpose for acquiring 'iVestern's route.
128 West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 (1952).
129 Delta-Chicago &: So. Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952).
130 Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955). The price of the
tangibles involved was not disclosed in the report.
131 Mackey-Midet Acquisition Case, 24 C.A.B. 51 (1956).
132 Byers Airways, Inc., 23 C.A.B. 428 (1956).
133 6 C.A.B. 671 (1946).
134 National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control, 6 C.A.B. 671, 682 (1946). In an earlier case,
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Route 38 case the CAB harshly criticized TWA for attempting to sell the
certificate for an unprofitable route to a local carrier for 100,000 dollars. 1811
In 1958, TWA was again the victim as the Board refused to approve the
sale of the Cincinnati-Detroit route to a local carrier for 310,000 dollars.136
Thus, there are limits to the tolerance of the CAB in approving transfers.
The Board has had a longstanding policy of encouraging improvement
of the route system through voluntary transfer of certificates.137 The Board
has felt that failure to allow an exchange value to be placed on route certificates would undermine the implementation of this policy.138 Sound as
these propositions may be, there remains the question of who pays the
ultimate price for transfer of certificates which are originally issued for the
"public convenience and necessity." At the outset, a distinction must be
drawn between subsidized and non-subsidized carriers. At present, all "local
service" carriers are on subsidy, whereas only one "trunkline" carrier receives a direct subsidy from the government. 139 Prior to 1961, local service
carriers often had an incentive to lower rates to appeal to a greater market
in order to enlarge their investment and thereby their subsidy. The main
focus of rate regulation was to maintain rates at a sound level to keep the
subsidy within reasonable bounds, since the subsidy was determined on
the basis of the individual needs of the carrier involved. 140 Businessmen
do not invest without expectation of profit, and, if the price paid is a sound
investment, a return must come from (I) the travelling public through
Mayflower Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 680 (1944), the Board refused to approve an acquisition
of operating routes and assets worth $8,300 for a price of $17,500, stating that "the sale
of certificates at inflated prices is inconsistent with the public interest and is not conducive
to the maintenance and development of an economically sound air transportation system."
Id. at 684. However, in a supplemental decision the Board relented and allowed the
purchase for $17,500. Mayflower Airlines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 139 (1944).
Transcontinental &: W. Air, Inc., 10 C.A.B. 455 (1949).
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 27 C.A.B. 440 (1958).
See West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 973 (1952); Southwest-W.
Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356, 357 (1951). In one case the Board suggested that TWA
transfer an unprofitable route to a local service carrier. Additional California-Nevada
Service, 10 C.A.B. 405 (1949). TWA did so but attached a right of reverter and a restraint
on alienation. The Board reluctantly approved the transfer. Bonanza Air Lines, Inc., 10
C.A.B. 873 (1949). A majority of the Board has never discussed the meaning of § 40l(i)
of the Federal Aviation Act, which provides that no certificate shall confer any "proprietary" or "property" right in the use of any air space.
138 In the Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955), the Board
decided not to charge Pioneer's profit from the transaction against its final mail pay
because the deal would become "unattractive" to Pioneer. In Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 347 U.S. 67 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the CAB must include profit from
sales of routes in the computation of mail pay. This case involved Western's profit from
the 1948 sale to United, which the Board had excluded from the computation in order
to encourage other voluntary route transfers. The Postmaster General, however, was
unwilling to pay.
139 Northeast Airlines, a "grandfather" carrier, has long been in financial trouble.
In 1963 the Board refused to renew Northeast's certification on the New York-Miami run,
New York-Florida Renewal Case, IA Av. L. REP. 1121396 (CAB 1963), and put Northeast
back on subsidy. CCH Av. L. REP. Newsletter No. 326, Sept. 27, 1963, p. 4.
140 See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954).
135
136
137
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higher rates, (2) the general public through a higher subsidy, or (3) operating economies resulting from the creation of a sounder economic unit.
Seemingly aware of these problems, the CAB has been reluctant, as in the
TWA transfer cases, to approve the sale of certificates to local service carriers at high prices. Often, approval of the transfer has required a showing
of significant savings by means of economy of operations.141 In 1961, the
CAB instituted class rates for the award of subsidies to local carriers.142
One of the avowed purposes was to create an incentive to charge higher
rates, 143 taking some pressure off the subsidy payments. Nevertheless, the
problem of keeping the price paid from being passed on to passengers and
shippers is more acute. Since the incentive now is to raise rates, the CAB
must be as diligent in scrutinizing rate increases as it must be in requiring
proof of the prospective economies of a proposed transfer.
Transfer of certificates to non-subsidized trunklines presents a somewhat different problem. Trunklines cannot expect to recover the price
through government subsidy; so they must look to profit through better
operation of the route, or through the greater efficiency of a better integrated route system. If the route transferred is highly competitive, concern over the transfer price is at a minimum. The acquiring carrier will
have to match the rates of competing airlines. In this way, the transfer
price cannot be directly passed on to the travelling public through higher
rates; 144 it must be made up through more efficient operation. On the other
hand, if there is no competing service on the route transferred, the purchase
price may be passed on to the public directly by higher rates. However, this
possibility may be minimized by diligent rate regulation, and by the insistence of the Board that, at least to a certain extent, the purchase price of
certificates be justified by prospective operating efficiencies.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The policies of the FCC and ICC on transfer applications have not
hindered the entry, or rather the substitution, of new competition. However, transfer of certificates has not been a significant means of entry into
the business of air carriage. No new air carrier has so entered.145 Over
the years, the number of original "grandfather" air carriers, which are
the trunkline carriers, has diminished from eighteen to only eleven. At the
See, e.g., Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955).
The subsidy which each carrier receives is based on available seat-miles flown,
but the rate per seat-mile varies inversely with the density of operations expressed in terms
of revenue plane-miles per station per day. Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation,
IA Av. L. REP. ,I2II34 (CAB 1961).
143 Id. at 14455.
144 This conclusion is somewhat weakened by the fact that airlines are in oligopolistic
competition, with only a few carriers over most competitive routes. See CAVES, Am. TRANS·
PORT AND rrs REGULATORS 356-77 (1962).
145 But see R. D. Fenno, II C.A.B. 1029 (1950). Changes in the form of business organization have been approved. Turner Airlines, Inc., 10 C.A.B. 695 (1949).
141
142
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same time, no non-grandfather carrier has been certified to operate over the
better trunkline routes.146 This diminution of the number of trunkline
carriers is but one consequence of the Board's solicitous attitude toward
the health of existing trunklines.147 Perhaps airlines are unwilling to sell
their routes to prospective purchasers, but CAB general policies on entry
of new carriers have no doubt discouraged any attempt to enter air carriage
by transfer of routes. This result, if unfortunate, is at least consistent.
With respect to the entry of established firms into new markets, the
policies of the ICC and the CAB do not differ radically. Both agencies have
duties to promote the well-being of the industries they regulate,148 and thus
are always interested in the effects of a proposed transfer on competing
carriers. On the other hand, the promotional duties of the FCC are somewhat less distinct; and the history of radio and television broadcasting has
not been characterized by financial difficulties resulting from "destructive"
competition. 149 It is not surprising, therefore, that the only effective limitations on the expansion of broadcasters through purchase of other licenses
are the multiple ownership rules coupled with the "duopoly" rules.1150 The
FCC does not consider the effects on competitors to be an important factor
in passing on applications for transfers.1111
It is in regard to the price to be paid that the contrast among the respective policies of the three agencies is most distinct. The FCC makes no attempt to control the price of transfer. The public does not pay directly for
the service provided, nor is any question of subsidy involved. On the other
hand, the ICC is reluctant to approve transfer at a price well beyond the
value of the tangible assets involved. Most often, this reluctance is rooted,
at least ostensibly, in the willingness of the ICC to second-guess carrier
management as to the advisability of the price to be paid. Less often perhaps, the ICC is concerned lest a large investment in routes be reflected
in higher rates, for trucking is a highly competitive business, and this tends
to minimize chances of a direct passing-on of the price to shippers through
higher rates. The CAB is probably more careful than the ICC about approval of transfer price. The subsidy problem has been partly responsible,
but more important is the greater danger of higher rates. The impetus for
146
141

But see Cincinnati-Detroit Route Suspension Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 63 (1960).
See generally RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION

(1961).

148 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(a), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1958);
Declaration of the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding
§ 1 (1958).
149 The tendencies of thought which the use of the term "destructive competition"
implies were significant in the passage of both the Motor Carrier Act and the Civil
Aeronautics Act. See FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION
7-23 (1961 ).
150 See notes 41, 42 supra.
151 See Camden Radio, Inc., 9 P & F RADIO REcs. 359 (1953), rev'd, 220 F.2d 191
(D.C. Cir. 1954); cf. Southeastern Enterprises, 22 F.C.C. 605 (1957). See also 22 FCC ANN.
REP. ll3 (1956).
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rate changes comes from the airlines, with the CAB controlling changes
principally through its power to suspend new tariffs.152 Most trunkline
routes offer competitive service,153 which inhibits a carrier's raising of rates.
Competition for passenger traffic also comes from railroads, buses, and
private automobiles. However, airline rates are substantially higher,154 and
thus airline rates are not particularly responsive to competition from other
modes of passenger transportation. Competitive controls over airline rates
must come principally from other air carriers, and in an oligopolistic setting, the airlines have not been vigorous in price competition. The dangers
of higher rates, or the lack of initiative to lower rates, is greater in regard
to airlines than in regard to truckers. It is therefore to be expected that the
CAB would be more sensitive than the ICC to the purchase prices paid
for routes.
Alexander E. Bennett
152 Federal Aviation .Act of 1958, § 102(g), 72 Stat. 790, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1958).
lli3 See MEYER, P.ECK, STENASON &: ZWICK, COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRI.ES 229 (1960).
154 See 23 AIR TRANSPORT AssocIATION OF .AMERICA, FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT AIR
TRANSPORTATION 10 (1962).

